As Yemen’s Houthis expand the Iran War by attempting to block the straits of Bab al-Mandeb in the Red Sea, our overstretched Navy struggles to keep both choke points open. Since the early 1980s, I have argued that the Marine Corps could play a key economy-of-force role both in blocking enemy ships and keeping straits open for free trade. From that time until 2019, the Corps had all the tools to do both missions. By occupying and defending allied territory in both the Bab al-Mandeb and the Straits of Hormuz, the Marines then conduct shore-to-shore amphibious landings to occupy and sanitize both Iranian and Houthi mobile missile launchers that they use to prevent freedom of navigation by U.S.-flagged and neutral shipping.
Unfortunately, the Marines no longer have that capability. Due to some poor decisions by the last Marine Corps commandant, and lethargic inaction by the present one, the actions described in the last paragraph can no longer be performed. General David Berger pronounced amphibious operations dead when he took over leadership of the Corps late in the last decade. Accordingly, he divested the Corps of the tanks and heavy engineering equipment necessary to conduct large-scale amphibious operations. Along the way, the Corps has lost much of the planning skills and expertise needed to conduct operations such as Guadalcanal, Inchon, or even the invasion of Grenada. (RELATED: Our Generals Are Failing Us)
Most amphibious experts I know believe it would take at least a decade to rebuild the kind of organic capabilities and experience lost seven years ago.
At the present time, Marine Corps amphibious expertise consists of small-scale raids, evacuation operations, and sea-borne humanitarian assistance. Thus far, the Marine contribution to the conflict has been limited to fast roping to the decks of merchantmen to capture or inspect them. That is of little help at the operational and strategic levels of war and does not justify the billions spent on maintaining the Corps. Most amphibious experts I know believe it would take at least a decade to rebuild the kind of organic capabilities and experience lost seven years ago.
However, as the six-week conflict evolves into yet another “forever war,” the generals and politicians may begin to search for new options to break the stalemate. Within three months, we could scrape together two Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) capable of amphibious landings in Hormuz and the Red Sea. If we could attach an Army tank and heavy engineer/bridging battalion to both MEBs, we could do much more than mere aerial bombing.
I use the three-month window as the minimum time needed to cross-train the soldiers on Marine Corps combined arms training and amphibious operations. As we learned at Gallipoli in World War I, you cannot just throw untrained soldiers on a ship and expect them to conduct this most complicated of military operations successfully against a hostile shoreline.
Also, it would take at least that long to prepare the staff to plan and logistically support multi-battalion landings. Since 2019, Marine Corps schools have drastically cut back the number of hours spent on amphibious theory and practice. This is particularly true of logistics, which is the key to operations ashore. The task would be somewhat eased if most operations are conducted shore to shore from the friendly side of the choke point. Even so, the Corps and Navy might have to employ retired logisticians and amphibious planners to both instruct and assist in planning for any contemplated amphibious foray. (RELATED: The Marine Corps Is No Longer Ready for Urban Warfare)
Before General David Berger came along and implemented his defensive missile-oriented Force Design concept seven years ago, the Marine Corps had been working to develop new tactics, techniques, and technologies that would enable the Corps to operate successfully in a modern shore defense system. Most of that work was temporarily halted with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and stopped entirely when Force Design began. To date, the Corps has not yet live-fired a single missile or sunk a target ship promised in Force Design. (RELATED: A To-Do List for the Next Marine Corps Commandant)
If the MEBs are properly task-organized, the admiral running Central Command would then have the option of attacking and seizing Kharg Island and/or sending ground forces to suppress or destroy mobile Iranian and Houthi anti-ship missile and drone launchers. Marine aircraft armed with anti-ship missiles would ensure that the straits would remain clear of enemy warships. Whatever we have been doing with airpower alone is clearly not working.
READ MORE from Gary Anderson:
Our Generals Are Failing Us
Let’s Get it Right This Time
The Washington Post Occasionally Gets It Right
Gary Anderson retired as chief of staff of the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab. Earlier in his career, he lectured on amphibious operations at the Marine Corps University.