A discussion on the space race 75 years ago would highlight a series of achievements and competitions ping ponging between the United States (U.S.) and the Soviet Union. In a 2025 post-cold war era, due to a series of post-soviet economic and political transitions and challenges, Russia no longer remains the sole major player alongside the U.S. – China has exploded onto the scene. This continued competition carries consequences of technological advancement, national security, economic supremacy, and the very balance of global power in the 21st century.

The race to dominate space is not simply about technology or exploration; it is about safeguarding the principles of democracy and international cooperation. While conflict is not inevitable, we hold the responsibility to protect and defend the final frontier. Should China be allowed to lead in space governance, it would set a dangerous precedent for how new frontiers are utilized in the future to progress an oppressive societies’ belief-systems, as they have shown in areas such as the Belt and Road initiative.

Sidelining democratic principles is not something the U.S. allows when gravity is at play, nor should it be allowed on the final frontier. Winning this race against China ensures that space remains a domain where transparency, free enterprise, and peace thrive, shaping the future of humanity’s exploration.

The creation of the U.S. Space Force in 2019 was met with both advocates and critics, yet, the move was a pivotal moment for national security, and symbolized a major realignment and reprioritization. By aggregating space-related military operations from several branches and entities under the Department of the Air Force, the U.S. made a clear statement that space is a critical domain. Establishing the Space Force prioritized and organized the U.S. military’s space-related operations and defense capabilities. Imagine a world in which the Trump 45 administration had held off on this critical infrastructure – the U.S. would be 8 years behind. This move prompted folks to see space beyond a lens of exploration and raised awareness of space as a key battle ground.

The U.S. continues to make notable advancements, but so too is China – as indicated through the Chinese increase in spend on exploration, infrastructure, and satellite deployment. While the U.S. is still the clear leader having launched approximately 5,000 satellites, China’s increased launches, combined with its focus on military applications, demonstrates its intent to challenge U.S. dominance. Since the inception of the Chinese National Space Administration (CNSA) in 1992, China has launched over 1,000 satellites and has made its intentions clear: they aim to surpass the U.S. in both technological and defense advancements on the final frontier. While not vocal on the national stage, both China and Russia have developed counter space capabilities which pose a major risk for U.S. satellites with system capabilities aimed to kill our satellites through tracking, targeting, and striking capabilities.

Currently, the U.S. outspends China by a margin of $73 to $14 billion in government-funded space activities. This financial commitment has tangible benefits for U.S. national security. Our focus on maintaining competitive endurance in pacing this threat, highlights America’s set position as the undisputed leader in space. Space showcases yet another example that economic growth through innovation, while maintaining prevailing democratic values through space governance over authoritarian regimes, is non-negotiable for the U.S. and our allies.

While the U.S. is making major strides, China’s expansion in this domain poses a direct challenge to U.S. leadership. As China continues to increase its spend and prominence in the space race, the U.S. must ensure its ability to maintain strategic advantages in orbit. This is prevalent in the face of anti-satellite technologies, and space-based weaponry, which remain preeminent concerns to the U.S. and its allies. Although China has made impressive strides in space exploration, it still faces significant challenges compared to the U.S., particularly in the areas of private sector involvement and space governance partnered with international cooperation.As evidenced in the 2024 Commercial Space Strategy, leadership in space-based technology and innovation in partnership with the U.S. government includes the development of cutting-edge technologies: satellite constellations, space tourism, lunar exploration, and new resource exploration and development. While marred in competition, the advantage in this fight remains ours. Due to its democratic structure, the U.S. benefits from private sector innovation in concert with historical experience, military capabilities, and international partnerships with its allies. These advancements bolster U.S. economic growth and ensure that America prevails as the hub for the next generation of high-tech industries, on land and in space.

As the space race continues to evolve, should the U.S. keep its foot on the gas, these advantages will play a key role in maintaining its position as a global space leader.

Taylor Hathorn is a visiting fellow at Independent Women. She has over 10 years of experience in cybersecurity, policy, public relations, and non-profit management.

With the U.S. and Europe distracted by multiple political and economic issues, the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan saw an opportunity to eliminate his main political rival and further secure his hold on power. The Mayor of İstanbul, Ekrem İmamoğlu was arrested on 19 March. While it may help Erdoğan in the short term, it accelerated Turkey’s slow decline into authoritarianism.

Erdoğan has held the reins of power continuously for twenty-two years. He became Prime Minister in 2003 following electoral success by the fledgling AK (Justice and Development) Party. As Prime Minister, he used his legislative majority to engineer constitutional changes that shifted executive power from the Prime Minister to the President. He then successfully became President in 2014. Having secured reelection in a unique runoff in 2024, he will not face the electorate again until May of 2028. His actions indicate he would like to remain in power even longer.

İmamoğlu emerged as a rival following his election as mayor of İstanbul, Turkey’s largest city, in March 2019. This was a major blow to Erdoğan and the AK Party, which had controlled the city for a quarter-century. The AK Party tried to void the election results in the city of 16 million, alleging irregularities. The challenge resulted in a repeat of the election a few months later, which İmamoğlu also won. He retained his seat following elections in 2024 where the CH (Republican Peoples’) Party made significant gains nationwide.

Since he was elected Mayor, İmamoğlu has faced multiple criminal cases designed to discredit him as a leader and diminish his popularity as a candidate. So far, all the charges appear to be at best weak and at worst fabricated. Nevertheless, if convicted, he could face prison and a political ban.

He is currently appealing a 2022 conviction for insulting members of Turkey’s Supreme Electoral Council. Additionally, İstanbul University recently discovered after 30 years that there may be some issues with credits transferred from a university in Northern Cyprus that invalidate his diploma. If upheld, the decision effectively bars him from running for president, since the position requires candidates to be university graduates. As with the other accusations, this will have to be settled in the courts.

There has been significant public outrage over the treatment of İmamoğlu both domestically and internationally. Of course, the CHP is outspoken. Ankara Mayor Mansur Yavaş calls it an embarrassment and CHP leader Özgür Özel compares it to “Italian mafia methods.”  Other opposition groups within Turkey have made similar comments.

More significant has been the international reaction. It appears that no government has issued a statement supporting Erdoğan’s actions. The U.S. government has remained silent, which could be interpreted as tacit support for Erdoğan. In contrast, support for İmamoğlu has been extensive. The EU has sent a delegation to meet with him in prison and most individual EU member countries as well as other bodies have expressed support. The Council of Europe, which focuses on promoting human rights and democracy, demanded İmamoğlu’s immediate release while Soner Çağaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (and an Erdoğan biographer) characterized Erdoğan’s actions as exclusively focused on removing a political rival.

Of course this is a disturbing event in isolation, but it needs to be put into context to be fully appreciated. When he first came to power in 2003, Erdoğan said all the right things. He appeared to work toward EU membership. Riding a wave of global economic prosperity, he embarked on a massive infrastructure program focused on airports, roads, and urban development. He has remained on this course regardless of the costs. The results are certainly impressive for foreign visitors, but they do not appear to have had an appropriate impact on the economy. The overall and per capita GDP have not grown at a rate commiserate with such an investment. Granted, due to Erdoğan’s adherence to fringe economic theories, inflation has been devastating. It is currently at 39%, down from a high of 78%. Taken together, Inflation, an excessive reliance on imports, and to a lesser extent foreign denominated debt have combined to suppress the economy. In response to the public outcry against this mishandling and other grievances, there are currently thousands of political prisoners and hundreds of jailed journalists across Turkey.

This sort of behavior has frequently been overlooked, and Turkey has been euphemistically referred to as a “competitive” authoritarian state, where different parties retained the ability to occasionally win elections. Recent events, not just the imprisonment of İmamoğlu, but also the brutal suppression and imprisonment of thousands of protestors and journalists, have pulled down this façade. Erdoğan does not adhere to the democratic and secularist foundations of the Republic of Turkey. He is an Islamist and is socially conservative, drawing support from rural, conservative, and religious groups. He has never shown commitment to the democratic process, unless that process appears to be working in his favor.

Authoritarianism is a bankrupt form of government. Authoritarian regimes seldom last more than a few decades and never produce sustainable wealth and prosperity for their citizens. It is past time to recognize this reality and take more aggressive steps to encourage Turkey back onto a viable path.

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Martin A. Perryman, a retired U.S. Army Colonel, is a defense and foreign policy expert.

Democratic strategist Julian Epstein explained on Newsmax Friday why Democratic New York Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez could not expand her popularity beyond the progressive left.

In a CNN/SSRS poll conducted on March 16, 10% of Democratic-leaning adults said Ocasio-Cortez best represents the core values of the Democratic Party. During an appearance on “Finnerty,” Epstein said that while AOC commands attention within the progressive “bubble,” she has failed to connect with centrist voters or the broader American electorate.

“I think she’s got incredible appeal within the progressive bubble. But I don’t think she has broad appeal beyond that. I don’t think she has appealed to the centrists of the party and certainly not a majority of the American electorate,” Epstein said when host Rob Finnerty suggested Ocasio-Cortez was “the real deal,” citing her massive social media following and energetic crowds.

Epstein then criticized the political culture that he said Ocasio-Cortez embodies, comparing it to an “OnlyFans-type” model that prioritizes online activism and identity politics over mainstream electoral appeal.

WATCH:

“The problem I think that the Democrats have is that they are no longer responding to voters, which is why the brand is so toxic. You look at the approval rating of congressional Democrats. It’s in the 20s,” Epstein said. “And AOC highlights what I think is becoming the culture, which is it’s becoming an OnlyFans type of culture.”

While Ocasio-Cortez remains a hero among progressive activists, Epstein predicted she would struggle to break through to the American mainstream, a challenge he believes reflects deeper problems within the Democratic Party itself.

“These politicians are interested in appealing increasingly to a narrow cast of online activists, donors, foundations, activists who will all exalt them as heroes within the progressive movement, all of whom depend on this sort of identity grievance politics,” Epstein said. “But it doesn’t have broad appeal. So I think while she’s very popular within progressive activist circles, I don’t see the appeal being wider than that.”

Former Democratic Senate candidate Morgan Harper said Tuesday that Ocasio-Cortez could face challenges winning over Midwestern voters if she runs for president in 2028. Harper told Fox News that although Ocasio-Cortez promotes “economic populism,” her background and message may not easily resonate in the Midwest.

Ocasio-Cortez tied for third place in voter support with Democratic New Jersey Sen. Cory Booker in a hypothetical 2028 Democratic presidential primary, according to a Data for Progress poll released April 16, trailing only former Vice President Kamala Harris and former Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg.

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They can evade radar and penetrate enemy airspace—but America’s most advanced aircraft can’t dodge a missile on the runway.

Earlier this month, the Pentagon deployed six B-2 stealth bombers to Diego Garcia, a remote U.S. airbase in the Indian Ocean. Within hours, satellite images of the bombers circulated widely on social media, showing them fully exposed on the tarmac—without hangars or shelters to protect them. While the B-2 is nearly impossible to detect or destroy in flight, it is a sitting duck on the ground.

Though Diego Garcia sits far outside the immediate threat environment, the bombers’ lack of protection is a serious risk. Amid ongoing U.S. strikes against Iran-backed Houthi forces in the Red Sea, reporting suggests Iran considered a preemptive strike on the base. The logic is clear: the U.S. Air Force operates just 19 active B-2 bombers. Destroying the six parked at Diego Garcia would cripple the fleet—and with it, the air leg of America’s nuclear triad.

Just a decade ago, it would have been unthinkable that a country like Iran could threaten a base as remote as Diego Garcia. But advances in ballistic missile technology and the spread of small, low-flying drones have made once-safe facilities far more vulnerable. Iran-backed Houthi forces have already launched long-range ballistic missiles at Israel and attacked U.S. Navy and civilian vessels with sophisticated drones. Earlier this year, Air Force leaders testified that hundreds of unidentified drones had flown over U.S. bases and sensitive sites—evading detection and overwhelming current counter-UAS systems. The Air Force is taking these developments seriously, but it’s still struggling to adapt.

That’s why building passive defenses—like hardened shelters—isn’t optional anymore. It’s the fastest, most cost-effective way to protect aircraft from threats that are already here. And it’s not just about the bombers we have today—without better protection, American airpower could be lost on the ground before they ever enter the fight.

Exposed on the Tarmac
Beyond the Red Sea, resourceful Ukrainian strikes have exposed a major vulnerability on the modern battlefield. Using cheap, low-flying drones, Ukrainian forces have evaded Russian air defenses and hit critical targets deep behind enemy lines—including munition depots, bombers, and even stealth fighters parked in the open on runways.

The U.S. military faces the same exposure. The lack of hardened shelters—constructed from reinforced concrete and steel, designed to protect aircraft from shrapnel, explosions, and other blast damage—is a long-standing problem acknowledged inside the Pentagon and extends well beyond facilities on Diego Garcia. B-2s require specialized hangars for maintenance and protection, but in recent expeditionary deployments—such as to Australia—they’ve often been left exposed on the tarmac due to the lack of adequate infrastructure. At Andersen Air Force Base on Guam, a critical regional hub, the number of hardened aircraft shelters is insufficient to accommodate the full complement of aircraft that rotate through the base. When large air wings deploy to the region, even the most advanced fighters and high-value tankers are routinely left exposed on open tarmacs, vulnerable to a potential first strike.

Major U.S. air hubs like Guam and Okinawa face far greater threats than drones. Their proximity to China and Taiwan places them squarely within range of Beijing’s growing arsenal of advanced ballistic missiles, making them likely first targets in any conflict.

According to a recent report by Timothy Walton and Thomas Shugart of the Hudson Institute, just a few dozen Chinese ballistic missiles armed with submunitions could damage or destroy nearly all the aircraft parked on the ramps at these bases. As few as 5 missiles aimed at facilities in Diego Garcia could cover the entirety of the ramp space where the B-2s are currently parked.

According to the latest estimates from the Pentagon’s China Military Power report, the PLA currently fields hundreds of missiles capable of these strikes. Recent high level wargames simulating a US-China conflict over Taiwan have predicted potential  mass strikes from China’s arsenal—in some scenarios, 90 percent of US aircraft were destroyed on the ground rather than in the air.

Hardening the Bases
Despite these warnings, the Pentagon has lagged in building protection for grounded air forces. Findings in that same Hudson report indicate that China has continued to race ahead: in the last decade China has built more than 400 hardened aircraft shelters, while the US has built just 22 in the Indo-Pacific. Major military facilities in Guam still have zero hardened aircraft shelters.

Air defense for Air Force bases has historically been an Army responsibility—but the Army has been facing its own problems in meeting the growing demand for air and missile defenses. Though the Joint Force has historically prioritized active defenses and advanced interceptors to protect bases. But recent operations indicate that the US military may not have the magazine depth to protect against massed, low-cost fires. Speaking recently on the viability of intercepting Chinese missile attacks with advanced interceptors, Former Secretary of the Air Force, Frank Kendall, emphasized “The economics just don’t work. So we need something more cost-effective than those.”

That’s where passive defenses come in. Hardened aircraft shelters are a proven, affordable solution—and should be a congressional priority. In this year’s budget request, the Pentagon requested $406 million to procure just 12 advanced Standard Missile 3 interceptors, capable of intercepting the most advanced threats. For the same cost, the Pentagon could build 100 hardened aircraft shelters. Both capabilities are essential, but shelters offer a far more cost-effective second line of defense—ensuring that when interceptors fail or are overwhelmed, aircraft and crews are still protected.

The solution should be hardened bases across the board, but annual military construction spending hasn’t kept pace. Infrastructure and military construction is chronically underfunded and it’s well-documented that US military bases are literally falling apart. The lack of real topline growth in the defense budget in recent years has prompted policymakers to shift and defer military construction spending, exacerbating an already serious backlog. The Pentagon currently faces an estimated $137 billion backlog in funds for modernizing key facilities.

Nowhere is the gap more apparent than in the Indo-Pacific. INDOPACOM’s FY 2025 Unfunded Priority List outlined $11 billion in unmet requirements for the region that were not included in the President’s Budget Request, including $3.3 billion for military construction alone. These include key military construction projects across the services: new Army, Navy, and Air Force facilities at frontline locations that are essential for sustaining operations in a high-end conflict.

Efforts to improve base resilience in the Indo-Pacific are receiving minimal attention. In the FY 2025 request, the Department of Defense proposed $15.6 billion for military construction worldwide—just 1.8 percent of the total $850 billion budget request. But with only $14.7 billion appropriated under the continuing resolution, military construction remains one of the most constrained parts of the defense budget. Despite clear operational demands, base resiliency has not moved up the priority list—particularly in the Indo-Pacific.

Conclusion
As Congress reviews President Trump’s first defense budget request and considers upcoming supplemental spending, hardening U.S. airbases must be a top priority. Next-generation aircraft like the B-21 stealth bomber and future F-47 fighter may be the most advanced and lethal platforms the Air Force has ever fielded—but if they’re destroyed on the tarmac before takeoff, none of that will matter.

Congress should act now to fund hardened aircraft shelters, rapid dispersal infrastructure, and passive defenses across the Indo-Pacific—starting with high-value bases like Guam and Diego Garcia. Missile interceptors are essential, but shelters ensure that when defenses fail, aircraft survive to strike back. This is a proven, cost-effective investment—and one the U.S. should be making at scale. The future of American airpower depends not just on what we fly, but whether we can protect it while it’s parked.

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Cole Spiller is a Research Associate at a D.C.-based think tank, where he researches defense strategy, budgets, and military readiness.

Suddenly, the lights go out. So does the heat. It’s not a localized disruption – all of DC is down. So are New York, Denver, and parts of Hawaii and Texas. It lasts for hours, then days. It becomes clear this was intentional, a massive cyber-attack by China. Businesses can’t function. Wall Street halts trading. Mass looting breaks out. Societal panic sets in.

While the scenario may sound extreme, the threat is very real. Many across the defense and national security community and pockets of private industry use shorthand to refer to it: Volt Typhoon (VT). It is the name of a Chinese hacking group tasked with sabotaging U.S. critical infrastructure to keep America distracted and cowed during a Chinese military invasion of Taiwan. The scenario is changing how members of both the government and private sector think about war, energy, and their respective roles maintaining a safe, secure, and economically prosperous United States.

A catastrophic VT attack is still hypothetical, but its precursors are all too real. During Russia’s three-year war in Ukraine, we’ve witnessed repeated cyberattacks on civilian energy infrastructure, often coordinated with missile strikes to maximize impact on the Ukrainian populace. Here at home, the Colonial Pipeline cyber-attack of 2021 provided a tiny preview of what VT could look like. Spikes in gas prices. Fuel shortages up and down the east coast. Bubbling alarm.

As VT and similar destructive cyber operations have become increasingly central to our adversaries’ theories of military victory against the United States, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) – in concert with civilian agencies – must take on a larger role to protect energy infrastructure here in the homeland.

Modern Warfare Pushes DoD into New Territory
The emerging challenge for DoD is stated clearly in a little-known August 2024 Defense Science Board (DSB) report on the DoD’s dependencies on critical infrastructure. The report notes that military installations in the homeland – which would be used to project power out to the front in the event of a war with China – rely in many cases on civilian power. As a result, any interruption of that power supply, say via a cyber-attack on the privately owned utility or gas pipeline, would have direct impacts on the DoD’s ability to mobilize forces. In contemplating a VT scenario’s impact on the U.S. military, the report states, “Significant disruptions in force projection infrastructure most certainly will doom a ‘short war.’ But a ‘long war’ is equally fraught—persistent attacks on infrastructure could sap the nation’s will to fight.”

The DSB report makes several recommendations, including that the DoD stand up a permanent mission infrastructure resilience organization, which “is structured and resourced to support long-term partnerships across key sectors in the interagency and with civilian infrastructure owners.” The report envisions this new permanent DoD entity would play a major role in mitigating the risks to DoD of an adversarial attack on civilian energy infrastructure (as well as transportation, communications, water, and other critical infrastructure) through ongoing analysis, intelligence and threat assessment, and gaming and exercises.

For those who have been watching the critical infrastructure security and resilience space for years, the idea of a major DoD role is somewhat novel. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have historically been the leaders in working with private industry to protect critical infrastructure from major cyber-attacks. These civilian agencies operate under established frameworks and authorities dating back more than a decade, and re-codified as recently as last year in the Biden administration’s National Security Memorandum-22. The DSB report emphasizes, however, that DoD can play a much more effective role than it has to date by organizing to better participate with civilian agencies and civilian infrastructure owners.

DoD’s attention in recent decades has been focused abroad: in fighting, supporting, or preparing for wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Ukraine, Israel/Gaza, the Taiwan strait, and other swaths of the Middle East and Africa. DoD activity in the homeland quickly bumps up against legal, jurisdiction, and precedential questions. The Posse Comitatus Act, for example, prohibits the use of federal military forces for domestic law enforcement without explicit congressional authorization. As a result of this and related laws and norms, DoD has historically been quite careful to cede leadership on homeland security issues to the civilian agencies.

However, now that attacks on homeland critical infrastructure are central to near-peer adversaries’ war plans, it is only natural that DoD’s interest would gravitate in that direction. Beyond the DSB report, several indicators point to potential focus from the Trump administration in a larger role for DoD in homeland security. Secretary of Defense Hegseth noted a focus on homeland defense in his first message to the force, has reportedly prioritized funding to support U.S. Northern Command while de-emphasizing all other geographic combatant commands except Indo-Pacific Command, and is rapidly working to implement two major homeland defense missions ordered by the President: securing the southern border and building a homeland missile defense shield.

The administration’s focus on readiness for a potential conflict with China may also contribute to a growing DoD role on critical infrastructure vulnerabilities. Concepts like U.S. Army North’s Multi-Domain Resiliency Zone (MDRZ), which calls for “all-domain protection of assets an adversary may target when they want to disrupt our mission” are still nascent, but could be scaled up quickly to deepen DoD’s security collaboration with civilian energy infrastructure partners here in the homeland. At the same time, CISA is facing significant staff reductions and the dissolution of long-established mechanisms for public-private information sharing, which could limit its ability to set the agenda on private sector engagement and cede ground to influence from DoD.

Private Sector Enters the Fight
With all that said, DoD’s ability to mitigate a VT scenario – just like that of DHS, CISA, and FBI – will run headlong into a decades-old fundamental constraint: the willingness and capability of individual utilities, oil, gas, renewables, and other energy companies to protect their infrastructure from national security threats on their own dime. There are certain regulatory security requirements for the energy sector, including the North American Reliability Corporation-Critical Infrastructure Protection (NERC-CIP) standards for the utilities industry and the more recent Transportation Security Administration (TSA) cybersecurity requirements for pipelines. However, strategic collaboration between the government and private sector on critical infrastructure protection and national security issues has always been voluntary and, ultimately, has yielded an environment still highly vulnerable to VT and similar threats and risks.

Fortunately, some infrastructure owners and operators in the energy sector are leaning forward and choosing to work proactively with the U.S. government, including with the DoD, beyond what is required by regulation. Dominion Energy, a Fortune 500 energy company which is responsible for power across several states has welcomed a full-time Marine Corps detailee into their security operations center. The Marine Corps pays the officer’s salary through a military fellowship program. The detailee learns the latest private sector methods of securing corporate networks and Dominion receives a highly qualified expert who can ensure tight coordination between Dominion’s defensive cyber operations and those of the DoD. Adam Lee, vice president and chief security officer at Dominion, notes, “It would be difficult to have a closer relationship with DoD on these issues than we have at Dominion.” However, Dominion is still the exception rather than the norm. Investment across the industry is uneven and there is a lack of standardization among companies on how to work with federal agencies.

Beyond infrastructure owners and operators, other parts of the energy sector are increasingly engaged in defense and national security issues like VT. Startups and growing companies that specialize in microgrids, small modular reactor nuclear technology, geothermal energy, and other energy resilience solutions have found a willing partner and funder in the DoD. Recently, DoD announced the selection of 11 companies as potential partners for rapid deployment of geothermal energy technologies at military bases, which could hypothetically make these installations less dependent on the civilian grid and more resilient in a VT scenario. Rob Klenner, President of GreenFire Energy, one of the companies selected, said in an interview that “GreenFire is prioritizing its work with the DoD and is eager to be the first company to provide geothermal power on a base here in the homeland, ensuring resilient power to the military in any scenario.”

Speeding Up, Scaling Up
Ongoing efforts in both the government and private sector, therefore, are promising. A growing DoD role – if managed carefully in coordination with civilian agencies – could also be a force multiplier that injects resources and attention into a perennially thorny challenge. The question is whether planning efforts are moving at sufficient speed and scale to prevent or mitigate the worst of a VT scenario and ensure the United States maintains an advantage in any future war. To increase our readiness, key actions must be taken both by the government and the private sector.

The Trump administration should move rapidly to implement the recommendations in last year’s DSB report, aligning these efforts with its recent EO on streamlining existing federal policy on resilience and critical infrastructure security. This would contribute to the administration’s priorities to defend the homeland and deter Chinese aggression. It would also provide DoD with the framework and resources to attack the critical infrastructure vulnerability problem set in a way we’ve never seen from the U.S. military. When facing the threat we see from VT, that mission for the military is appropriate as long as it is conducted in partnership with civilian agencies and in accordance with law and the Constitution.

To incentivize private sector collaboration with DoD, DHS, and FBI, the administration should also develop a proposal for Congress to financially incentivize critical infrastructure companies to implement stronger security and engage more proactively with the federal government. A purely voluntary approach to these challenges has yielded limited results. Regulations have a place but often have the unintended consequence of forcing private sector companies into compliance-based rather than risk-based cultures and sapping them of the creativity we need to see on such challenging issues. Financial incentives, such as a tax credit for developing a corporate strategy to contribute to national security, would have a better chance of achieving the desired results.

Energy infrastructure owners, operators, and technology developers shouldn’t wait for further signals from the government to lean forward. Proactive companies are already reaping the benefits: reduced risk to their assets, improved reputation, and in the case of some, free labor or new contracts with the DoD and other federal agencies. As the government’s attention on critical infrastructure security continues to grow in coming years, the companies already engaged are likely to see significant cost savings and efficiencies, whether in the form of quicker compliance, fewer additional investments, or even government funding or incentives.

The path for energy companies who want to jump into this space is straightforward: invest, build, and engage. Invest in analytical capabilities to understand and monitor the national security, defense, and critical infrastructure protection issues likely to impact your business. Build a whole-of-business strategy that outlines corporate efforts to support U.S. national security objectives, including by protecting assets from VT-style attacks and being responsive to U.S. policy priorities. And engage proactively with the DoD, national security agencies, state and local governments, industry peers, the public, and the media on these critical issues.

Conclusion
The nature of warfare is changing. With it, we are seeing major shifts in U.S. defense priorities and the expectations of private sector critical infrastructure companies, especially in the energy sector. Luckily, many capable and driven individuals across the government and private sector are already working assiduously on preventing VT-style catastrophic scenarios. But more must be done. The fight is just getting started.

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Mark Freedman is Principal and CEO of Rebel Global Security. He previously served at the U.S. Department of State, including as Chief of Staff for the Bureau of Counterterrorism and as a strategic planner in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

The Guttmacher Institute’s Monthly Abortion Provision Study for 2024 shows “1,038,100 clinician-provided abortions in states without total abortion bans in 2024, an increase of less than 1% from 2023.” Planned Parenthood’s former “special affiliate” and research arm claimed that “[t]he overall stability in the number of abortions in states without total bans continued despite shifts in policy that have increased obstacles to accessing this care in many states.”

Does this mean that the increase in abortion numbers is beginning to stabilize since the end of Roe v. Wade? Maybe — but maybe not. As Guttmacher notes, its new figures are an underestimate.

Key Takeaways:

• Guttmacher’s new 2024 figures are an underestimate, as it did not track data in states with ‘total bans’ on abortion.
• Guttmacher’s yearly abortion figure for 2024 is 1,038,100 “clinician-provided” abortions. This doesn’t include all abortions.
• This new 2024 figure equates to 2,844 abortions daily, nearly 119 per hour, nearly two per minute, and slightly more than one every 30 seconds.
• Guttmacher has reported over 64 million preborn human lives lost to abortion in the U.S. since 1973.
• ‘Telehealth’ abortion increased in 2024, though most abortions still took place in brick-and-mortar facilities.
• Travel from pro-life to pro-abortion states continued in 2024, though the proportion traveling decreased.
• Prior to the reversal of Roe v. Wade, Guttmacher used a more reliable method of data collection every few years. Since that time, it has chosen to release less reliable monthly “estimates.”

“Our estimates exclude any abortions provided in states with total bans (through shield law provision, community health networks, online pharmacies or other means),” Guttmacher wrote, “and therefore represent an underestimate of the total number of abortions nationally” (emphasis added).

Since 1973, Guttmacher has reported over 64 million preborn lives lost to abortion, and that number is likely larger, given the exclusions.

Guttmacher footnoted, “Throughout most of 2024, 14 states had total bans on abortion in effect. North Dakota’s total ban was repealed on September 26, 2024 (although the state remains without any abortion providers) and Missouri’s total ban was blocked on December 20, bringing the number with an explicit total ban down to 12” (emphasis added).

Guttmacher’s newly-updated figure reveals that in 2024, at least 2,844 abortions were committed daily in the U.S. — nearly 119 abortions per hour, nearly two per minute, and slightly more than one abortion committed every 30 seconds.

Beginning in 2017, the United States saw the end of a long-term decline in the number of abortions, with numbers beginning to tick upwards year after year. By 2020, abortions totaled 930,160 — an increase of nearly 8% from 2017. Then, in May of 2024, the Guttmacher Institute updated its total abortion estimate for 2023, revealing that 1,037,000 abortions were recorded by the formal health care system that year (which does not include chemical abortions obtained from online pharmacies, etc.) This time, the increase over three years was in the double digits, revealing a spike of 11.5% from 2020.

Sharp decreases in specific states

According to Guttmacher, “Florida experienced a particularly sharp decline in the number of abortions provided after a six-week ban went into effect in May 2024: Over the full calendar year, there were 12,100 fewer abortions provided in the state in 2024 than in 2023.”

In 2023, Florida reported a total of 84,052 abortions but that dropped to 64,854 reported for 2024 (Florida’s six-week protections were instituted in May of that year.) So far in 2025, Florida has reported 8,682 abortions.

In addition, Guttmacher noted that”South Carolina’s six-week ban went into effect in September 2023; as a result, the state had the second-largest decline (after Florida), with 3,500 fewer abortions provided in the state in 2024 than in 2023.”

Even pro-abortion states reportedly saw some declines after the end of Roe. Guttmacher noted that “Colorado and New Mexico declined by around 2,400 cases each between 2023 and 2024, but total counts in these states remained substantially higher in 2024 than their baselines before Roe v. Wade was overturned in 2022.”

These decreases may not last. New Mexico’s governor began funneling millions into building a new state-funded abortion facility in 2022 (which opened near the end of 2024), and this year added another $10 million to the state budget to construct a second abortion facility with taxpayer dollars. And Colorado just passed a bill forcing taxpayers to fund abortions in the state.

Guttmacher suggested that “The decreases in [Colorado and New Mexico] may be happening in part because of increases in clinic capacity in Kansas, which had an increase in abortions provided from 2023 to 2024.”

Other states saw increases. “Clinician-provided abortion care was largely unavailable in Wisconsin following the overturning of Roe until the latter half of 2023; as a result, the state had a large increase from 1,300 abortions provided in 2023 to 6,100 in 2024 (an increase of 388%) as access expanded.”

Additional states — including some with expansions under ballot initiatives — also saw increases. According to the report, “Arizona, California, Kansas, Ohio, and Virginia had substantial increases in the number of abortions provided (ranging from an increase of 3,000 in Arizona to 5,500 in Virginia),” with Guttmacher adding that Virginia likely “absorbed patients affected by Florida’s six-week abortion ban after it went into effect in May 2024.”

Kansas reportedly saw an increase of 3,300 abortions for out-of-state patients, while Virginia saw an increase of 4,300. “This increase in travel from other states was the main driver of increased abortion counts overall in both states,” wrote Guttmacher, “although other factors like expanded clinic capacity also may have increased access for state residents.”

Abortion pill data and online abortion increases

Guttmacher noted how ‘telehealth’ abortion is increasing, writing, “The share of abortions in states without total bans that were provided via online-only clinics rose to 14% in 2024 from 10% in 2023 (an increase of around 40,000 abortions),” adding that the national abortion share for “online-only clinics” is “almost certainly higher than this, as the 14% proportion does not include shield law provision into states with total abortion bans.” Guttmacher noted that “Recent estimates from the #WeCount study document that 34,500 medication abortions were provided via shield laws to states with total bans in the first half of 2024.”

Despite this increase, Guttmacher noted that most abortions in 2024 still took place in brick-and-mortar abortion businesses, as “[t]elehealth provision is not an available or preferred option for everyone seeking an abortion.”

Abortion pill data for 2024 has not been published; however, Guttmacher estimated that the abortion pill accounted for 63% of abortions in 2023 — a 45% increase from 2017. In February of 2025, Guttmacher reported the distribution of 648,500 abortion pills in 2023 (54,042 monthly, 1,777 daily, 74 hourly, and one abortion by pill every 49 seconds).

“The number of medication abortions provided in US states without total abortion bans increased by 19% between 2019 and 2020, and by 32% between 2020 and 2023,” Guttmacher wrote.

The Monthly Abortion Provision Study previously reiterated that its abortion pill counts don’t include those that “take place outside of the formal health care system” or those “mailed to people in states with total abortion bans.”

How Guttmacher gathers data

Since the Dobbs decision in 2022, two agencies have attempted to publish estimated abortion data: the Guttmacher Institute and the Society of Family Planning (SFP) — or #WeCount, the latter of which was founded in 2005 with a contribution from the Packard Foundation. SFP is heavily funded by the Buffett Foundation. Now, instead of reporting updated data every few years or so as it did prior to Dobbs, Guttmacher has chosen to publish monthly abortion estimates on a regular basis.

Nationally, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) also publishes data, but it is generally not seen as comprehensive as what Guttmacher provides. The CDC utilizes data provided by states while Guttmacher surveys abortion providers. Many states do not require reporting of any kind on abortion.

As previously noted, the monthly Guttmacher study “estimates the number of clinician-provided abortions that take place each month in each US state without a total ban,” but excludes “any abortions provided in states with total bans” as well as those obtained through online pharmacies or other means.

But this isn’t the same methodology that Guttmacher used before the end of Roe v. Wade.

In past reports, Guttmacher relied on the “Institute’s Abortion Provider Census (APC), fielded every three years since 1974″ described as “the most comprehensive data collection effort on abortion provision in the United States.” Guttmacher claimed that “Each census is a sustained effort requiring a long fielding period, significant follow-up and substantial time and effort from abortion providers themselves.”

Then, in late 2023, after nearly 50 years of using the same methodology, Guttmacher changed and began publishing monthly abortion estimates, which it openly suggested is less reliable than what it previously used. “The Monthly Abortion Provision Study… produc[es] a slimmer portfolio of data but at a much quicker pace. Its design is responsive to the needs of policymakers, advocates and other stakeholders in the fast-changing landscape of US abortion policy and provision and attempts to minimize the time required of staff at surveyed facilities” (emphases added) Guttmacher wrote.

Abortion travel continued, with a slight decrease

Guttmacher claimed that in 2024, there was a decline in people traveling to “states without total bans” to access abortion, writing that “the proportion of people traveling across state lines to obtain an abortion declined slightly, from 16% to 15%,” which is “approximately 155,100 people” compared to the 169,700 who traveled across state lines in 2023. Yet, “it is still close to double the number who did so before the end of Roe (81,100 in 2020).”

The states with the highest number of abortions provided to out-of-state residents in 2024 were reportedly the same four as in 2023:

• Illinois: 35,000 abortions, representing 39% of all abortions provided in the state
• North Carolina: 16,700 abortions (36% of abortions in the state)
• Kansas: 16,100 abortions (71% of abortions in the state)
• New Mexico: 12,800 abortions (69% of abortions in the state)

“Out-of-state residents represented the majority of abortions provided in New Mexico in 2024 (69%), and slightly over one-quarter (26%) of abortions provided in Colorado. Both states, however, experienced declines in the overall number of abortions provided between 2023 and 2024, driven largely by declines in travel from out of state: New Mexico provided 1,900 fewer abortions to out-of-state residents in 2024, and Colorado provided 1,200 fewer,” wrote the pro-abortion group.

[Editor’s note: This story originally was published by Live Action News.]

(HUMAN EVENTS) – President Donald Trump and Ukraine’s President Volodymr Zelenskyy met briefly at St. Peter’s Basilica where both men were in attendance on Saturday at the funeral of Pope Francis. This comes after a contentious week that saw peace talks between Ukraine and neighbor Russia break down, as well as a strike on capital Kyiv at the hands of Russia.

Footage of their meeting shows the two men taking time in St. Peter’s Basilica after aides set up jsut two chairs so the two men can share a private conversation. Diplomacy between Russia and Ukraine, brokered by the US, has been in the public eye with both men speaking on social media about their intentions.

“Good meeting,” Zelensky posted, along with a photo of the two met engaged in what appears to be intense conversation. “We discussed a lot one on one. Hoping for results on everything we covered. Protecting lives of our people. Full and unconditional ceasefire. Reliable and lasting peace that will prevent another war from breaking out. Very symbolic meeting that has potential to become historic, if we achieve joint results.”

Prominent Jeffrey Epstein accuser Virginia Roberts Giuffre reportedly died by suicide at 41 years old on Friday, according to her family.

Before Epstein’s arrest and death in 2019, Giuffre became a leading voice against the billionaire, alleging she was recruited at age 16 by Epstein’s longtime associate Ghislaine Maxwell to perform sexual acts. In a statement to NBC News, her family said she died in Neergabby, Australia, where she had lived for several years.

“It is with utterly broken hearts that we announce that Virginia passed away last night at her farm in Western Australia,” her family told the outlet. “She lost her life to suicide, after being a lifelong victim of sexual abuse and sex trafficking.”

“Virginia was a fierce warrior in the fight against sexual abuse and sex trafficking. She was the light that lifted so many survivors,” her family added. “In the end, the toll of abuse is so heavy that it became unbearable for Virginia to handle its weight.”

On March 30, Giuffre posted on her Instagram account a picture of her bruised face, detailing how she had been involved in a car accident and was allegedly told by doctors that she only had days to live.

“This year has been the worst start to a new year, but I won’t bore anyone with the details but I think it important to note that when a school bus driver comes at you driving 110km as we were slowing for a turn that no matter what your car is made of it might as well be a tin can,” Giuffre wrote.

“I’ve gone into kidney renal failure, they’ve given me four days to live, transferring me to a specialist hospital in urology,” Giuffre added. “I’m ready to go, just not until I see my babies one last time, but you know what they say about wishes. S**T in one hand and wish in the other & I guarantee it’s still going to be s**t at the end of the day. Thank you all for being the wonderful people of the world and for being a great part of my life.”

During a December 2019 interview with the BBC, Giuffre detailed her accusations against Epstein, Maxwell and Prince Andrew, claiming she was forced to have sex with the prince at age 17. Prince Andrew has denied the allegations. Giuffre later tweeted that year that the FBI informed her of a “credible death threat.”

Pledging to release documents related to Epstein’s case, President Donald Trump told Daily Caller White House Correspondent Reagan Reese on Tuesday that he plans to speak with Attorney General Pam Bondi about the timeline for releasing the remaining files.

Content created by The Daily Caller News Foundation is available without charge to any eligible news publisher that can provide a large audience. For licensing opportunities of our original content, please contact licensing@dailycallernewsfoundation.org.

WATCH:

The gang of violent Venezuelans known as Tren de Aragua actually is worse than that sounds, according to a new report.

Because the gang now has been linked to the Venezuelan government.

It is the Washington Stand that reported according to a Federal Bureau of Investigation study, “Venezuela’s socialist president Nicolás Maduro and his deputies are using criminals from the Tren de Aragua (TdA) transnational gang as ‘proxies’ to ‘destabilize’ foreign nations, including Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and the U.S.”

The report said, “The FBI anticipates that TdA members the Venezuelan government has sent to the U.S. will, within the next six to 18 months, begin targeting and killing other Venezuelan nationals who have been opponents or critics of Maduro’s administration.”

President Donald Trump several times has charged that the Venezuelan government is weaponizing criminals in dangerous gangs and sending foreign terrorists into the U.S.

“These findings should shock Americans but not the law enforcement community,” a Trump administration official who was not identified, told Fox News.

“They reflect the sentiments of numerous other intelligence assessments across multiple agencies.”

That official explained Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro “is a Marxist dictator who hijacked a once-prosperous Venezuela and brought in nothing but total economic collapse and gang takeover. He crumbled Caracas, now overrun with drugs and violence, and wants to do the same across the United States by sending his most violent and dangerous criminals into our communities.”

The Trump administration has worked to utilize several laws to crack down on the illegal access to the United States by the gang members, and to deport those who have arrived.

The fact that the Venezuelan government is “aiding and abetting” the terror gang was confirmed, in the report, by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

An official in the ODNI assessed that the links between the terrorists and the government there mirror “the behavior of the Taliban in Afghanistan and other Middle Eastern failed states like Syria and Libya that have welcomed terrorists with open arms.”

While a National Intelligence Council report accessed by the AP claimed there’s no link, one expert suggested that was incorrect, based on “leakers.”

The “propaganda media conveniently did not include [more accurate intelligence] because it gets in the way of their biased narrative and attempt to deceive the American people,” the expert said.

DNI Tulsi Gabbard explained, “The Office of the Director of National Intelligence fully supports the assessment that the foreign terrorist organization, Tren De Aragua, is acting with the support of the Maduro Regime, and thus subject to arrest, detention and removal as alien enemies of the United States.”

The State Department earlier this year designated TdA as a foreign terror organization.

Trump has said, “TdA is closely aligned with, and indeed has infiltrated, the Maduro regime, including its military and law enforcement apparatus. Venezuelan national and local authorities have ceded ever-greater control over their territories to transnational criminal organizations, including TdA. The result is a hybrid criminal state that is perpetrating an invasion of and predatory incursion into the United States, and which poses a substantial danger to the United States.”

In just the past few days, several dozen TdA members and leaders have been charged under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Most of those defendants are in custody.