WND

The Trump administration today announced that the number of illegal-alien border crossing attempts in February was the lowest in U.S. history – a mere 8.326.

President Trump shared the data on social media, writing, “There were only 8,326 apprehensions of illegals by Border Patrol at the U.S.-Mexico border, all of whom were quickly ejected from our Nation or, when necessary, prosecuted for crimes against the United States of America.”

Continuing, Trump announced, “The invasion of our country is OVER.”

During the Biden administration, there were as many as 300,000 illegal crossings in a month, “and virtually ALL of them were released into our County,” Trump noted.

? HISTORIC LOW ?

February saw the lowest illegal crossings in history—just 8,326. Every illegal was removed or prosecuted.

Under Biden? 300,000+ per month.

The Border is CLOSED. The Invasion is OVER. ?￰ﾟﾇﾸ pic.twitter.com/Ojl0TM1GlQ

— The White House (@WhiteHouse) March 1, 2025

CBS reported that on some days during a record spike in illegal crossings under President Biden, Border Patrol recorded more than 8,000 apprehensions in a single day.

Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem also posted on X, thanking the president for his leadership.

“February was the lowest month in recorded history for encounters at our border,” wrote Noem. “The world is hearing our message: do not come to our country illegally. If you do, we will find you, arrest you, and send you back. Thank you President @realDonaldTrump for your strong leadership and to our brave @CBP officers and agents for keeping America safe.

“We’re just getting started.”

A federal judge late Friday evening blocked President Trump’s executive order restricting federal aid to hospitals and healthcare clinics that perform transgender surgeries on minors.

Trump previously signed two executive orders aimed at protecting children from monsters who surgically mutilate minors and give them cross-sex hormones.

President Trump’s order directed federally funded programs such as Medicaid, military and other insurance programs to exclude transgender surgeries.

Various left-wing LGBTQ and family doctor groups sued Trump to challenge the executive orders.

Attorneys for the plaintiffs argued that President Trump’s executive order is “unlawful and unconstitutional” because it blocks federal funds previously allocated by Congress.

On Friday US District Judge Lauren King, a Biden appointee, blocked Trump’s executive orders after her previous restraining order expired.

The judge said Trump’s executive order doesn’t target surgeries on “cisgender children.”

“In fact, its inadequate ‘means-end fit’ would prevent federally funded medical providers from providing necessary medical treatments to transgender youth that are completely unrelated to gender identity,” the judge wrote, according to AP. “For example, a cisgender teen could obtain puberty blockers from such a provider as a component of cancer treatment, but a transgender teen with the same cancer care plan could not.”

The Associated Press reported:

President Donald Trump’s plan to pull federal funding from institutions that provide gender-affirming care for transgender youth will remain blocked on a long-term basis under a federal judge’s ruling in Seattle late Friday.

U.S. District Court Judge Lauren King previously granted a two-week restraining order after the Democratic attorneys general of Washington, Oregon and Minnesota sued the Trump administration — Colorado has since joined the case.

King’s temporary order expired Friday, and she held arguments that day before issuing a preliminary injunction blocking most of Trump’s plan pending a final decision on the merits of the case. She rejected a portion of the states’ challenge regarding the order’s protections against female genital mutilation, on grounds that “no credible threat of prosecution exists” in such cases.

By February 21, 2025, the trumpet has sounded: Donald Trump’s second term has begun, and with it, the swift reversal of Biden’s LNG export pause. This isn’t mere policy tinkering—it’s a seismic recalibration of America’s role in the global energy chessboard. For conservatives, it’s a clarion call to reclaim energy dominance, secure jobs, and outmaneuver rivals. Yet, as the United States barrels toward an LNG export renaissance, a fresh realism must guide us—one that marries unapologetic ambition with a clear-eyed reckoning of trade-offs. RealClearEnergy readers—policymakers, industry titans, and patriots—deserve a vision that celebrates this moment while charting its complexities.

The Triumph of American Shale

Let’s start with the stakes. Biden’s 2024 LNG export freeze was a sop to climate ideologues, stalling terminals like CP2 and choking billions in Gulf Coast investment. Trump’s Day One reversal—likely formalized by now—unleashes a torrent: the U.S., already the world’s top LNG exporter at 11.9 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d), could double capacity by 2035, hitting 30 Bcf/d with 12 new projects. This isn’t just gas—it’s leverage. Europe, unshackled from Russia’s grip since Ukraine’s transit deal died January 1, 2025, will guzzle 20 Bcf/d by decade’s end. Asia, led by China’s 100 million metric tons per annum (MTPA) appetite, follows suit. The American Petroleum Institute pegs this at 1.5 million jobs—welders in Louisiana, traders in Houston, families thriving.

Conservatives see the gospel here: free markets, not green dogma, deliver prosperity. LNG exports, projected to rival oil’s $200 billion annual haul, turbocharge GDP while slashing allies’ reliance on despots. Russia’s Gazprom, bled dry at 5% of global LNG share, can’t compete with Sabine Pass’s bounty. Qatar scrambles as U.S. shale undercuts its Hormuz Strait chokehold. This is Reagan’s “peace through strength” reborn—energy as a weapon of liberty, not coercion.

A New Realism: Beyond Blind Boosterism

Yet, triumphalism alone won’t suffice. LNG’s ascent demands a conservatism that’s muscular but mature—call it “shale realism.” First, the price paradox: flooding markets with 100 MTPA could drop global LNG from $15/MMBtu to $8 by 2032, a boon for buyers but a squeeze on producers. Henry Hub, at $2.50/MMBtu today, might climb to $4 as exports drain stocks, testing Trump’s “cheap energy” pledge. Conservatives mustn’t flinch—higher domestic prices are the cost of global primacy, a trade-off worth every penny if it bankrupts Putin’s war chest.

Second, the tariff tightrope. Trump’s 10% EU levy threat—60% for China—could backfire. Europe might stomach it, grateful for gas over Russian blackmail, but China’s retaliation could cap U.S. LNG at 15 MTPA, rerouting flows to Japan or India. Here’s a novel fix: tie LNG deals to trade pacts—discounts for tariff waivers. Imagine Beijing swapping solar panel exports for $10/MMBtu gas, a détente that cools trade wars while greening China’s grid. It’s pragmatic, not pandering—a conservative win through cunning.

The Climate Conundrum: LNG as Bridge, Not Bogeyman

Enter the green chorus: LNG’s methane leaks—1% of output, per the Environmental Defense Fund—could add 100 million tons of CO2-equivalent annually at scale. Trump’s likely methane rule rollback stokes their ire, and they’re not wrong to flag emissions. But here’s where shale realism shines: LNG isn’t the enemy of climate goals—it’s the midwife. Displacing Europe’s coal (30% cleaner) and China’s (55% of its mix), U.S. gas could cut global emissions by 500 million tons yearly, dwarfing leaks. By 2040, this bridge could halve coal’s share, buying time for fusion or next-gen solar.

Critics cry “fossil fuel lock-in,” but that’s a strawman. LNG’s flexibility—unlike rigid pipelines—lets renewables scale without blackouts. Picture Germany: its coal plants fade as U.S. gas fills gaps, wind turbines humming by 2035. Conservatives should own this narrative: LNG isn’t denialism—it’s discipline, a transition fuel that starves tyrants while science catches up.

Geopolitical Judo: Flipping the Board

Now, the grand play. Trump’s LNG surge isn’t just supply—it’s strategy. Europe, at 40% of exports by 2030, becomes a U.S. vassal in energy, not ideology—NATO’s glue thickens without a bullet fired. China, hooked on 20% of our LNG, trades coal smog for American molecules, a dependency Trump can tweak with tariffs or diplomacy. Russia, limping at 20 billion cubic meters to Europe, pivots to a discounted Siberia 2—China pays $8/MMBtu, not $12, bleeding Moscow dry.

Here’s an original twist: LNG as soft power. Trump could launch an “Energy Freedom Initiative”—subsidized exports to Africa’s microgrids, outpacing China’s $50 billion oil grab. Kenya’s 100 MW solar pairs with U.S. gas backups, electrifying villages without Beijing’s strings. By 2040, America owns the developing world’s energy soul—capitalism’s quiet coup.

The Balanced Ledger: Risks and Remedies

Shale realism demands candor. Oversupply risks stranding $50 billion in terminals if Europe goes 60% renewable by 2035—Cheniere’s bet could sour. Methane’s shadow looms; a voluntary industry standard—say, 0.5% leakage caps—could blunt critics without EPA meddling. Trade wars might shrink exports to 20 Bcf/d, but a “LNG bloc” with Japan and India hedges that bet.

Conservatives mustn’t dodge these. Champion LNG, yes, but innovate: tax credits for methane capture, not just drilling. Pair exports with fusion R&D—$1 trillion by 2040, privately led. This isn’t capitulation—it’s command of the future.

The Verdict: A Legacy Worth Forging

Trump’s LNG reversal is a conservative dream: jobs, power, liberty. By 2035, 35 Bcf/d could flow—40% to Asia, 30% to Europe—redefining energy’s map. Prices might settle at $10/MMBtu, coal withers, and Russia fades. Yet, shale realism elevates this beyond bravado. It’s a chance to wield LNG as a scalpel—cutting rivals, bridging climate gaps, and electrifying allies—all while fueling America’s heartland.

RealClearEnergy’s readers know the drill: energy isn’t sentiment—it’s strategy. Trump 2.0 can etch a legacy not just of dominance, but of dexterity. Let’s seize it, eyes wide open, and shape a world where American gas lights the way.

 

Ronald Beaty is a former Barnstable County Commissioner, and a lifelong resident of Cape Cod, Massachusetts.

Topline: Victims of natural disasters deserve the best help possible, so it’s important for the Federal Emergency Management Agency to monitor the companies it hires and ensure they are performing effectively.

But some FEMA staff in charge of oversight for the $2.7 billion in contracts awarded last year haven’t been properly trained and are “unqualified” for their own jobs, auditors from the Government Accountability Office wrote in a Feb. 6 report.

Specifically, GAO reviewed 15 contracts awarded in response to the Kentucky floods, Hurricane Ian, and the Maui wildfires between FY2018 and FY2023, when contracts for these disasters totaled more than $1 billion.

Key facts: FEMA employees must complete at least 100 hours of training within two years to become certified contracting officers who provide oversight for the companies FEMA hires.

Over 370 of FEMA’s more than 2,000 contracting officers had expired certifications as of August 2024, the GAO found.

Some officers that were properly certified found that FEMA’s training course had deficiencies. One officer told the GAO, “No training class can prepare someone to be successful on the first day, and field experience, on-the-job training, and mentorship are more important.”

FEMA told the GAO that only one-third of their contracting officers actually work on active contracts, and regular reviews are conducted to ensure they are all properly certified. However, a later section of the report notes that FEMA officials “do not track the number of hours individuals may work to conduct contract oversight.”

For one-third of the contracts reviewed by the GAO, FEMA did not check to make sure contractors were performing up to standard. A company was paid $185 million to inspect schools and hospitals after Hurricane Ian and determine if they needed grants to repair damages, but “there is no documentary evidence … that FEMA officials knew the quality and timeliness” of the inspections, the GAO wrote.

Search all federal, state and local government salaries and vendor spending with the AI search bot, Benjamin, at OpenTheBooks.com.

Summary: Department of Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem and President Donald Trump have both supported shutting down FEMA. It sounds like a drastic action, but it’s clear that at least some changes are long overdue.

The #WasteOfTheDay is brought to you by the forensic auditors at OpenTheBooks.com

When President Trump decided to rename the Gulf of Mexico to the Gulf of America, he wasn’t spending too much time thinking about how the Associated Press would respond.

The Associated Press may not have spent a lot of time thinking about how to respond either, but when they decided to keep using the old name, they started a journalistic skirmish that is bread and butter for the Trump administration.

In retaliation, Trump’s press aides banned the AP from an Oval Office pool, and later from attending a news conference and traveling on Air Force One. The president himself said that these were privileges and that the restrictions would continue until the news organization relented.

Mind you, the AP wasn’t exactly belligerent. In a statement, Amanda Barrett explained that “Trump’s order only carries authority within the United States. Mexico, as well as other countries and international bodies, do not have to recognize the name change. The Gulf of Mexico has carried that name for more than 400 years. The Associated Press will refer to it by its original name while acknowledging the new name Trump has chosen.”

For the AP, that’s pretty reasonable. They often make no concessions to reality at all.

It must have been sometime in 2015, for instance, when I read a news story by the Associated Press about a convicted military whistleblower named Chelsea Manning.

At that time I was the managing editor of the Daily Inter Lake newspaper in Kalispell, Montana, and I was constantly monitoring the news wire for stories of interest to our local readership.

Something about Manning seemed familiar. There had been several famous cases of service members or intelligence agents who had passed classified material to WikiLeaks, but I couldn’t remember any woman who had done so. Still, something nagged at my reporter’s brain and I decided to Google-search “Chelsea Manning.”

It was then that I discovered that Chelsea Manning was none other than Bradley Manning, the former U.S. Army soldier who was convicted in 2013 of multiple violations of the Espionage Act.

How, I wondered, could the AP change Bradley Manning into Chelsea Manning without any acknowledgement that the original Manning had ever existed?

I soon found out how – by following the AP Stylebook, which was once the gold standard guiding newspaper people on grammar, spelling, and usage coast-to-coast. But AP has turned into an unregulated and self-administered experiment in social engineering. Turns out that back in August 2013, the Associated Press deemed (there is no better word for it) that people should be referred to by whatever damn pronoun they preferred, no matter what biology and social history said otherwise.

“The use of the first name Chelsea and feminine pronouns in Manning’s case is in conformity with the transgender guidance in the AP Stylebook,” the AP had announced. “The guidance calls for using the pronoun preferred by the individuals who have acquired the physical characteristics of the opposite sex or present themselves in a way that does not correspond with their sex at birth.”

AP cannot be solely blamed for the pronoun confusion that followed for the next 12 years, but they certainly went along for the ride.

And note: The worst aspect of this particular conversion was that Bradley Manning was “disappeared” altogether. On its own, the AP declared that Chelsea Manning existed and Bradley Manning didn’t. If, like me, you didn’t know who Chelsea Manning was, that was your problem. At least, in the current battle the Associated Press was willing to acknowledge that President Trump had renamed the gulf, even if they didn’t want to use the name themselves.

These may seem like relatively insignificant examples of media bias, but they point us in the right direction. As George Orwell famously observed in “Politics and the English Language,” “… if thought corrupts language, language can also corrupt thought.”

That is certainly true for the decision to adopt leftist language to describe gender as a choice rather than a scientific fact. It also applies to the AP’s embracing of racial ideology in its 2020 decision to capitalize Black when referring to individuals with high melanin content, but to continue to refer to Caucasians by the lower-case descriptor “white.”

Isn’t that blatant bias?

The AP justified its decision because it claims that the skin color black reflects “an essential and shared sense of history, identity and community among people who identify as Black, including those in the African diaspora and within Africa. The lowercase black is a color, not a person.”

So why is the lowercase white not simply a color? You can’t justify such a decision except when viewed within the framework of an ideological perspective. It is a conscious decision by a supposedly fair-minded journalistic organization to marginalize white culture, white history, and white identity.

If Black is to be capitalized, then why exactly can’t the AP declare that White will likewise be capitalized “in a racial, ethnic or cultural sense, conveying an essential and shared sense of history, identity and community among people who identify as White, including those in the European diaspora and within Europe. The lowercase white is a color, not a person.”

Certainly European culture, spread throughout the globe, is a force that “conveys an essential and shared sense of history, identity and community,” but the AP muddles that up with skin color. Black is a skin color, not a person. And so is white. If people want to use black and white as shorthand to describe a much larger cultural milieu, so be it. But do so evenhandedly, not to impose an ideological viewpoint.

The AP Stylebook is nothing more than an echo chamber where journalists can go to be reassured that their liberal bias is appropriate. The gulf that the AP should be worried about isn’t the Gulf of America, but the gulf between their Stylebook and reality.

The war that broke out on Oct. 7, 2023, has brought the Palestinian issue back to the forefront of the global, Middle Eastern, and Israeli agenda. The debate over how to address it – let alone resolve it –  continues as it has for the past half-century, and in various forms – for more than a century. Why have all attempts at an agreement failed since the Oslo Accords, and what does this suggest about the prospects for resolving the conflict? In light of its frustrating persistence, the conflict continues to generate a range of opposing assessments and proposals regarding the required course of action. Dismay and frustration are growing over the intractability of a conflict that has preoccupied much of the world’s attention for so long, even though the solution seems to be tantalizingly reachable.

The purpose of this article is not to assign moral blame to either party in the conflict – Israel or the Palestinians – but rather to analyze the reasons why every attempt to reach a final settlement has failed and what the implications of this are for the future, at least the foreseeable one. The main argument here is that the primary obstacle to implementing the two-state solution – on the face of it, the most logical, reasonable, and just solution to the conflict – lies in the aspirations of the Palestinian side and its fundamental perception of historical justice, which the two-state solution does not satisfy. At the same time, a particularly dangerous aspect of the conflict is that this impasse not only severely harms the Palestinians but also advances processes in Israel that pose a critical threat to its future.

Positions in Negotiations at Three Key Decision Points

Since the signing of the Oslo Accords, there have been three moments when negotiations for a permanent settlement reached a decision point: (1) the parameters proposed by U.S. President Bill Clinton in 2000; (2) the talks between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas from 2006 to 2008, held alongside the Annapolis Conference; and (3) U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s initiative from 2013 to 2014 during the Obama administration.

In each case, the proposed frameworks were very similar: an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, except for a small percentage, for which the Palestinians would be compensated with nearly equal or even equivalent land swaps within Israel’s pre-1967 borders; a Palestinian extraterritorial passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; the division of Jerusalem along ethno-national lines, granting a special status to the Temple Mount with de facto Palestinian control; Palestinian waiver of the “right of return” into Israel for the 1948 refugees, except for a symbolic number; and international assistance for their resettlement in the Palestinian state or absorption by the Arab countries where they have been residing since 1948.

The Palestinians rejected the Clinton parameters by making counter-demands that contradicted the initiative’s core principles. In the two later cases, the Palestinians ultimately withdrew from the negotiations without providing a final response, effectively “disappearing” from the process. There are deep underlying reasons for the Palestinian stance.

Fundamental Perceptions and Aspirations Among the Palestinians

At the heart of the Palestinian national ethos is the dream of return – of the 1948 refugees and their descendants, across generations – to their lost villages and cities in Israel. This aspiration holds far greater significance than the vision of an independent state alongside Israel. In many ways, the Palestinian struggle has been directed much more against the consequences of 1948 rather than the results of 1967. Even during the Oslo period, when the Palestinian public and leadership expressed greater openness to a two-state solution, Israel’s legitimacy was never recognized. The hope that any agreement reached would not be the end of the conflict was never abandoned, nor was the demand to give up on the “right of return” to Israel ever accepted. The idea of settling the issue of return through partial, symbolic measures or alternative arrangements was always fundamentally rejected.

These positions do not exist in a vacuum. They are anchored in an expectation that a two-state solution does not mean the end of the conflict but rather serves as a springboard for continued struggle. All this in the hope that, over time, Israel might disappear and be replaced by a Palestinian state encompassing the entire territory from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea, not fundamentally different from the PLO’s “phased strategy” from 1974.

The stark asymmetry in the balance of power between the strong Israel compared to the weak Palestinians reinforces the global image of Israel as “Goliath” and the Palestinians as “David.” However, the reality of the conflict is one of dual asymmetry: While Israel has marked superiority in many areas, certainly in comparison to the Palestinians, it remains deeply inferior in terms of population, territory, and potentially resources and political strength vis-à-vis the broader Arab-Muslim world. Within this framework, acceptance of Israel is perceived not only as a failure to rectify the historical injustice but also as a national defeat and humiliation.

Throughout the conflict, this second asymmetry has fueled Arab hopes that Israel would eventually be defeated and disappear from the map – much like the Crusaders, who were expelled after a struggle lasting around 200 years. Even as parts of the Arab world have grown weary of the conflict’s costs and have signed peace agreements with Israel, Israel’s lack of legitimacy and the hope for its eventual disappearance remain deeply ingrained in the Arab public. Among the Palestinians – the group most directly involved in the conflict – this sentiment is even stronger. Throughout the conflict, this position has persisted, pinning hopes in the emergence of a modern-day Saladin (such as Gamal Abdel Nasser, Saddam Hussein, or Iran), the demographic balance between Arabs and Jews in Israel-Palestine, and the Palestinians’ adherence to their fundamental positions, particularly their commitment to prolonged struggle, with violent resistance at its core.

Unlike his predecessor Yasser Arafat, who personified the Palestinian struggle, Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) has consistently rejected armed struggle against Israel as being detrimental to the Palestinian cause. His stance, along with the Palestinian Authority’s security cooperation with Israel – although not perfect – against Hamas and other militant groups in the West Bank, is of crucial practical importance. However, Abbas’s Holocaust denial, his repeated claims that there is no Jewish people, and that Israel lacks both historical roots in the land and moral legitimacy, as well as his refusal to accept the formula of “two states for two peoples,” reflect the fundamental Palestinian perspective.

A few within the Palestinian leadership and public recognize that implementing the “right of return” is unlikely and that symbolic compromises or alternative solutions for the refugees should be accepted. Such views were voiced by some of Arafat’s subordinates during the Camp David talks in 2000 – which, in respect to them, Abbas himself opposed the notion of forgoing the “right of return.” However, given the vision of return’s deep roots in Palestinian national consciousness, even those who doubt its feasibility do not dare to openly renounce it. This unwillingness is driven not only by emotional and ideological convictions but also by a well-founded fear that doing so would endanger their lives. As Arafat told Clinton at Camp David: “If I betray, without a doubt, someone will come to kill me.”

Lenient Explanations for the Failure of Negotiations for a Final Settlement

In light of the resounding collapse of the Oslo Accords and the failure of the three rounds of permanent status talks, various explanations have been offered for the Palestinians’ unwillingness to accept the proposals presented to them. Regarding Clinton’s parameters, it has been claimed that the American president introduced them in the final days of his term, leaving the Palestinians uncertain about their implementation. A similar claim has been made about the negotiations between Olmert and Abbas, as Olmert had already lost his political support as prime minister and was close to resignation. Similarly, there has been no shortage of explanations for Abbas’ second “disappearance” when he was asked to make a decision on Kerry’s proposals.

However, the apologetic explanations for the failure of talks at the three decisive moments regarding a final status agreement – particularly in the first two cases, where the Israeli leadership was clearly eager to reach an agreement – overlook the deeper reasons for the Palestinians’ unwillingness: the absolute lack of legitimacy to formally and conclusively renounce the implementation of the “right of return” and the immense difficulty of granting legitimacy to Israel’s existence and recognizing the finality of the conflict. Otherwise, as many have pointed out, the Palestinians should have seized and secured the offers that were on the table, thereby putting any future Israeli government that sought to reject the agreement in an impossible position on the international stage.

Even if an agreement was to be reached with the Palestinian authority, here are two of the risks inherent in a two-state solution that are of concern to Israel. First, even if a Hamas rise to power was prohibited, or that of any other group that rejects a peace agreement, there is no practical guarantee against such a scenario. Whether through force or elections, the ascension of a hostile entity in a future Palestinian state located at the very heart of the country could pose a grave danger to Israel.

Demilitarization is often discussed in the context of peace agreements, although it has lost much of its former significance. Such a clause was particularly meaningful in an era when military threats were defined by heavy weaponry – primarily aircraft, tanks, armored vehicles, and heavy artillery. However, this reality has changed, especially in the Palestinian context. Current warfare is dominated by lightweight weaponry that is easily smuggled, locally produced in some cases, and difficult to detect. These include rockets, light drones, and anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles. In a sovereign Palestinian state, where the Israeli armed forces would no longer operate systematically and persistently, preventing the widespread proliferation of such weapons – whether with or without government approval – would be extremely difficult.

Indeed, this goes far beyond and irrespective of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Consider the telltale geopolitical realities in the Middle East: the collapse of the “Arab Spring” into murderous civil wars in Libya, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Sudan (and previously in Algeria and Lebanon) – in each of which hundreds of thousands have been killed.

Danger of No Peace Agreement in the Foreseeable Future

The assessment that a peace agreement with the Palestinians is unlikely in the foreseeable future raises questions about the implications of this deadlock and what will happen in the absence of an agreement.

The most pressing danger in a reality where there is no peace agreement on the horizon is the continued expansion of Jewish settlement deep within the West Bank, in densely populated Palestinian areas. This expansion is progressing by default, driven by settler activity – sometimes with government approval, sometimes without it. The long-term consequence of this trajectory is a reality in which political separation between the Palestinian and Jewish populations will no longer be feasible. This, in turn, poses the greatest threat to the future of the State of Israel, as it could lead to a binational Jewish-Arab state, one that would likely evolve into an Arab-Muslim state over the entire territory.

In contrast, the Israeli right, in its various ideological shades, lays out the following conceptual framework. The vision of the far right, largely driven by a concept of messianic redemption, advocates applying full Israeli sovereignty over all the territories, dismantling the Palestinian Authority, extensively expanding Jewish settlements, and employing harsh military measures and targeted expulsions to suppress Palestinian resistance. The far right supports actively encouraging large-scale Palestinian emigration from the territories, while those who remain would be granted permanent residency status but without Israeli citizenship. This camp regards President Trump’s recent proposal to resettle the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip elsewhere as a first step in the realization of its vision.

The mainstream Israeli right also supports settlement expansion, albeit with greater limitations. Many within this camp also believe that a significant demographic change can be achieved by encouraging Palestinian emigration to other countries. The mainstream right generally favors annexing large portions of the West Bank – particularly those with smaller Palestinian populations that are currently under direct Israeli control (Area C). However, in contrast to the far right, the mainstream right views Palestinian autonomy as a lesser evil and a necessary long-term solution for the areas that will not be annexed to Israel. The autonomy will allow for Palestinian self-governance over population centers while maintaining overall Israeli control.

Positions of the Israeli Right Critiqued

In the opinion of this author, there is no chance of fundamentally altering the demographic reality in the land which is Israel/Palestine: Two distinct ethno-national populations – Jewish and Arab – exist there, and they are there to stay. President Trump’s proposals with respect to the Gaza Strip are unlikely to be accepted – no more than his plans for Canada – and will not change this fundamental reality. The debate over whether there is an approaching numerical parity between Jews and Arabs or even an Arab majority between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean, or whether a Jewish majority will persist, is of little real significance. Currently, the State of Israel, with a citizen Arab minority comprising approximately 20% of its population, functions as a Jewish and democratic state, where civil equality and proper integration for the Arab minority can be maintained. However, a state in which Arabs make up about 40% of the population would effectively become a binational state, in which every issue would be viewed through the lens of ethnic conflict. (This is true even in relation to Belgium, which is effectively divided between Flemings and Walloons, despite the absence of violent conflict there.)

The question of whether the Arabs in the territories constitute a distinct Palestinian people entitled to self-determination in an independent state, or whether they are simply part of the broader Arab identity of the Middle East, is similarly pointless. The real issue is their citizenship. In today’s world, there is no precedent for a population being held indefinitely in conditions of statelessness. When China conquered Tibet, or when Russia annexed parts of Ukraine, both nations immediately applied their sovereignty over those territories, granting residents citizenship – whether they wanted it or not. However, for huge countries like China and Russia, such moves do not pose a demographic problem.

The mainstream Israeli right today seems to favor an approach in which the vast majority of Arabs in the territories would not be annexed to Israel but instead would remain citizens of a Palestinian autonomy. However, autonomy means a degree of self-government granted to citizens of a sovereign state in an area within the state’s recognized borders. Autonomy means that the residents of the autonomous region have both their own limited self-government, which they elect, and the right to participate in the election of the central government to which their autonomy is subordinate. Autonomous regions, such as the Basque Country in Spain, whose residents are Spanish citizens, vote in elections to the Spanish parliament and are entitled to be elected to it, including for leadership positions. This is also true of Scotland’s status in the United Kingdom, and of Greenland’s status within Denmark.

This is not merely a semantic issue. International norms do not recognize a separation between state sovereignty and citizenship. If a Palestinian autonomy is to exist, in which country will its residents hold citizenship? During his first term, President Trump – who was highly supportive of Israel and largely indifferent to any norms – innocently declared, to the shock of Israelis, that he had no preference between a one-state or two-state solution – “whatever you choose.” He too did not conceive of state sovereignty without citizenship.

More in line than “autonomy” with international norms is the notion of a Palestinian state with some limitations on its sovereignty. What is necessary and reasonable to expect within this framework is indeed demilitarization – although this concept is more challenging today – and Israel’s right to military intervention for self-defense if the Palestinian state fails to prevent terrorist activity or military threats. This principle aligns with the security understandings Israel reached with the United States regarding southern Lebanon in the November 2024 ceasefire agreement following its conflict with Hezbollah.

The idea of an Israeli-Palestinian – or even Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian – confederation is sometimes floated. Confederation is a vague concept, but it is generally understood to involve freedom of movement and residence throughout the entire territory, with individuals retaining the right to choose their citizenship. However, its supporters on the Israeli right often overlook what supporters on the left see as an advantage in their end-of-days vision of a shared life of peace and fraternity: movement and population mixing not in only one direction – Israelis into Judea and Samaria (and Gaza) – but in both directions, throughout the confederation. Even those who think that it is possible to maintain separate citizenships within the confederation’s boundaries should take into account the massive settlement of Arabs from the Palestinian territories and from all over the Middle East into Israel, which offers enormous economic advantages.

As in the rest of the world – and contrary to the hopes of the Israeli right – the uncontrollable pressure of emigration will be directed toward the developed world, into Israel, and not from it. Ultimately, even if, according to the agreement, these Arab settlers will not have the right to Israeli citizenship, they will demand it as permanent residents of Israel and as an integral part of its population. Their descendants, born in Israel, will certainly demand it as well, and it will be impossible to deny it to them over time. Given the broader regional demographics – with Israel the size of New Jersey – this process would ultimately lead to the end of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people – and possibly its end altogether.

Other Solutions?

This brings us to several alternative proposals that, while having stronger internal logic, still face immense practical difficulties.

One leading option is a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from approximately 70% of the West Bank and all of Gaza while retaining control of the major settlement blocs adjacent to the 1967 lines and the Jordan Valley, and maintaining Israel’s right to intervene militarily to prevent Hamas takeovers or the emergence of military or terrorist threats in the evacuated territory. Even if such disengagement does not immediately resolve the question of Palestinian sovereignty, it could be viewed internationally as a step in the right direction. More importantly, it would mitigate what many see as Israel’s greatest existential threat: the irreversible intermixing of the two populations and the move toward a one-state reality.

However, the obstacles to such a step – widely supported by the Israeli center-left – are immense. Public trust in unilateral separation suffered a severe blow following the consequences of the 2005 disengagement from Gaza, which led to the rise of Hamas, repeated rounds of fighting, rocket attacks on Israel, and the events of Oct. 7, 2023. Israel’s new security approach, whereby Israel will now act preemptively along its borders to thwart threats, has not alleviated these justified concerns.

Moreover, the situation on the ground has dramatically changed since the previous rounds of negotiations. Jewish settlements have expanded in the heart of densely populated Palestinian areas deep in the West Bank, making their evacuation almost impossible. Not only does the scope of the settlements prevent this, but the settlers’ resolute opposition to evacuation has been strengthened by the political climate in Israel following the protests against the 2023 judicial overhaul and what the right perceives as a refusal to recognize the authority of an elected government. Moreover, among a significant sector of the settlers, radicalization has intensified, expressed in a rejection of state authority and adherence to an ideology of violence against Palestinians.

Thus, even the idea of leaving the settlers in place after disengagement, rather than forcibly evacuating them, is also fraught with seemingly insurmountable challenges. Their continued presence in the area would undermine the very purpose of the disengagement between the populations and would inevitably result in violent clashes between armed settler militias and Palestinian forces and civilians.

Similar obstacles stand in the way of the idea of reaching a political agreement with the Palestinians that does not attempt to resolve all disputed issues immediately but rather postpones the most contentious ones. According to this approach, a Palestinian state would be established alongside Israel based on the parameters proposed in the three previous rounds of talks, while the final negotiations on the refugee issue and the “right of return” would be deferred to a later stage.

It can be argued that from the perspective of the international community and Israel’s friends, such an agreement would be perceived as final in practice. It would serve Israel’s primary interest of securing international legitimacy and enabling the separation between Israelis and Palestinians. However, given the Palestinians’ refusal to renounce the “right of return” – alongside the aforementioned numerous other obstacles on both sides to the arrangement – the likelihood of such an initiative gaining the confidence of the Israeli majority appears slim.

Another long-standing idea is that of a Jordanian-Palestinian federation encompassing the vast majority of the territories. This idea offers several potential advantages: The Hashemite Kingdom has historically been, and remains, a natural ally of Israel against Palestinian radicalism. The broader Jordanian-Palestinian framework would encompass a significant portion of the Palestinian diaspora, thereby expanding the political solution for the Palestinians beyond what they perceive as a truncated state in the West Bank and Gaza. In this framework, the Palestinian state would be connected to the Jordanian state through two federal legislative bodies, and the right of return would be granted to this federation.

However, it is unclear whether the Hashemite Kingdom would still be willing to consider such an arrangement, given that it would lead to an overwhelming Palestinian majority within the federation. From the Palestinian perspective, such an arrangement might be seen as a springboard toward a Palestinian state on both sides of the Jordan River. In the past, some Israelis have favored redirecting Palestinian national aspirations eastward as a desirable solution; however, some fear that this approach could ultimately strengthen a Palestinian adversary on both banks of the Jordan River, reviving the old Palestinian slogan that “the road to Jerusalem passes through Amman.”

In response to the settlement reality that has developed in the West Bank, the Trump administration in 2020 introduced the so-called “Deal of the Century.” Its key innovation was the idea of preserving all Jewish settlements, including those deep in the West Bank, placing them under Israeli sovereignty and connecting them to Israel through an extensive network of tunnels and bridges. According to this plan, Palestinian and Israeli-controlled areas would exist adjacent to each other and interspersed, with different access levels to ensure separation between the two states.

Despite its American architects’ strongly pro-Israel stance, the plan was met with a lukewarm reception even within the Israeli right-wing. Aside from Prime Minister Netanyahu, not a single right-wing Knesset member explicitly endorsed it, with many outright rejecting its terms because of its endorsement of a Palestinian state. Meanwhile, the likelihood of the Palestinians accepting this proposal – or President Trump’s current proposal for the Gaza Strip – is nil.

Conclusion

Reviewing the range of possibilities for an Israeli-Palestinian settlement – and the significant obstacles in its path – is both frustrating and, at times, even discouraging. The conflict is more deeply rooted than is often acknowledged. The seemingly small differences that remain between the positions of the two sides – Israeli and Palestinian – lead many to believe that only one or two small additional steps, combined with an “act of leadership” on both sides, are all that are needed to break through to a peace agreement. The comparison to Egypt and the peace deal achieved with it is also misleading. Egypt and Israel were not fighting over the same land, and for Egypt, the Israeli conflict was always secondary to its core national interests. While disengaging from the conflict was difficult and a blow to Egyptian national sentiment, it was still possible – even if it required Anwar Sadat to take an extraordinary political risk by defying the Egyptian and broader Arab world. The emergence of a Palestinian Sadat is not inconceivable, but such a leader would face far greater obstacles, and the likelihood of assassination for abandoning fundamental Palestinian positions is significantly higher.

Resolving the Palestinian issue remains an Israeli interest of the highest order, second only to Israel’s fundamental security and existence as a Jewish and democratic state. It is an illusion to think that Israel can survive without maintaining a decisive Jewish majority while simultaneously ensuring civil equality for its minority populations. Any action or inaction that makes political separation between Israelis and Palestinians more difficult endangers Israel’s very existence. Historically, Israel has benefited greatly from Palestinian rejectionism – from the Palestinian rejection of the 1937 Peel Commission partition plan to the 1947 UN partition plan and beyond. As former Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban famously remarked, “The Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.” However, Israel’s benefiting from Palestinian rejectionism has likely run its course, and Israel should not overextend itself beyond what it can sustain. Instead of the settlements in densely populated Palestinian areas deep in the West Bank strengthening Israeli interests, Israeli interests have become subservient to the settlers’ project.

Israel must halt further settlement expansion in densely populated Palestinian areas that will prevent the political separation of the two peoples. Additionally, Israel should adopt a position that Prime Minister Netanyahu expressed in his Bar-Ilan speech in 2009 – before he became politically beholden to the far right – when he asked whether a future Palestinian state would be “Iran or Costa Rica.” This position should include acceptance of the two-state solution, conditioned on practical changes by the Palestinian Authority regarding its discourse on Israel’s legitimacy, its financial support for the families of terrorists, and its effective abandonment of the “right of return.” These conditions should not serve as a right-wing excuse to prevent negotiations but rather because, as we have seen, they have real practical implications for the Palestinian Authority’s operative policy positions. Furthermore, any Israeli proposal must be contingent on securing international agreements, particularly with the United States, affirming Israel’s right to intervene militarily in Palestinian territory against any military or terrorist threat under the principle of self-defense, as was recently agreed upon regarding southern Lebanon.

It is difficult to envision the Palestinians accepting and implementing these conditions in the foreseeable future. However, such a stance would distance Israel from the threat of a one-state reality, shift the burden of proof to the Palestinian side, and provide Israel with legitimacy in the international arena – at least among its friends.

The Middle Eastern and global reality is dynamic and unpredictable. More than a year into a traumatic and turbulent war, its long-term impact on the Middle East in general and on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular remains unknown and far from fully understood. The Trump administration’s new initiatives are likely to meet the hard intractable realities of the Middle East. What their unintended consequences might be, and to what degree they might break the impasse, remains to be seen.

President Trump announced on Saturday that in the coming weeks, he will pardon Major League Baseball’s all-time base-hit leader, Cincinnati Reds, Philadelphia Phillies, and Montreal Expos legend Pete Rose, aka “Charlie Hustle.”

Despite holding records for the number of outs, games played, at-bats, and hits, Rose was permanently banned from baseball and never inducted into the Hall of Fame after he admitted to placing bets on his own team to win. While the former Reds manager and 17-time All-Star has been permanently banned from the game, the Hall of Fame in Cooperstown, New York, could still honor him with membership, but they never did.

“Major League Baseball didn’t have the courage or decency to put the late, great, Pete Rose, also known as ‘Charlie Hustle,’ into the Baseball Hall of fame,” said President Trump.

Rose passed in September 2024 at 83 years old.

Topline: The Inflation Reduction Act could be three times as expensive as originally believed, while falling short of its goals for cutting greenhouse gas emissions, according to an analysis from the environmental think tank The Breakthrough Institute.

Key facts: The 2022 IRA intended to reduce the federal deficit, lower prescription drug prices, and invest in domestic energy production while promoting clean energy. 

The Congressional Budget Office originally projected the clean energy incentives and tax subsidies in the IRA would cost $390 billion in the 10-year period from 2022 to 2031. Over the last two years, other groups have placed the cost much higher.

Goldman Sachs estimates the legislation’s clean energy provisions will actually cost $1.2 trillion. The National Bureau of Economic Research also believes the climate provisions will cost $900 billion to $1.2 trillion. Credit Suisse’s estimate came in at $800 billion — still more than twice what the CBO projected.

Meanwhile, the Princeton Net Zero Project estimated last year that by 2035, U.S. emission levels will only fall by 40% compared to 2005 levels. Princeton originally predicted the IRA would help cut emissions by 50%.

Lawmakers’ stated goal for the IRA was to cut emissions by 80% by 2030, when compared to 2005 levels.

Search all federal, state and local government salaries and vendor spending with the AI search bot, Benjamin, at OpenTheBooks.com.

Background: The Breakthrough Institute argues that the IRA’s apparent emission reduction failures stem from its commitment to subsidizing already well-established wind and solar technologies and electric vehicles.

Currently, the government pays for one-third of wind and solar installations and $7,500 for every electric vehicle purchased. Those subsidies alone could cost up to $650 billion in the next decade, Breakthrough estimates. There is good reason for calling them wasteful: most of the tax breaks for solar panels are going to wealthy families that can afford the panels.

Instead, the think tank believes the government should be subsidizing emerging technologies that search for new ways to store and transport the energy generated by wind and solar sources. Princeton’s studies support that idea, showing that 80% of the expected emissions reductions from the IRA will not happen unless America changes the way it transmits energy, not just generates it.

Critical quote: “The solution … is to invest in and deploy transmission and energy storage technologies to increase the value of intermittent energy by making it available where and when there is actual demand for it,” the Breakthrough Institute wrote. “We suspect that transmission, interconnection, and cheap battery storage are much more critical to the future of wind and solar — and the emissions benefits that additional wind and solar deployment might bring— than are the IRA tax credits.”

Summary: If the U.S. government is going to pump billions of dollars into green projects, it should be supporting useful solutions, not sinking more cash into stagnant technologies that have not yet proven to be economically viable.

The #WasteOfTheDay is brought to you by the forensic auditors at OpenTheBooks.com

Topline: The U.S. Agency for International Development sent $1.3 billion in foreign assistance to the Democratic Republic of the Congo last year, the world’s fifth-poorest country by GDP per capita.

The spending would be easier to stomach if the Congo was devoting all of its own resources toward caring for its people and still coming up short.

But new reporting from the Swiss magazine Die Weltwoche revealed that the country’s officials are splurging on their travel expenses. The Congo spent the equivalent of $488,000 on a six-night hotel stay during this year’s World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.

Key facts: The Congo delegation booked “several dozen” rooms at the five-star Hotel Quellenhof, even though there were only six official members in the country’s delegation to the Forum.

The tab works out to over $81,000 per night. The hotel describes itself as “a haven of peace where you can take time for yourself and your loved ones” and make “your holiday dreams come true.”

Switzerland’s delegation came under fire in 2023 for spending $128,000 on a hotel for the World Economic Forum, violating the country’s expense regulations, Die Weltwoche reported. The Congo, with much more limited resources, spent almost four times that amount.

The Congo is one of the 30 most corrupt countries in the world, according to Transparency International. At the World Economic Forum in 2020, the country booked 30 hotel rooms for almost $16,000, paid only $4,000, and then left Switzerland, Die Weltwoche reported.

Search all federal, state and local government salaries and vendor spending with the AI search bot, Benjamin, at OpenTheBooks.com.

Background: USAID funding for the Congo last year included humanitarian assistance, healthcare, “peace and security” bills and more. The $1.3 billion was funded through the Department of Agriculture, Department of State and USAID, with all funded managed by USAID.

President Donald Trump temporarily halted all foreign funding and shut down USAID, requiring federal employees to return home from the Congo. The funding freeze is blocked by a federal judge as of Feb. 17.

Summary: Rigorous oversight of foreign funding is needed if and when USAID reopens. American taxpayers should not be assisting governments who spend their citizens’ money on luxury resorts.

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WATCH IN FULL: @SecRubio puts on a masterclass as he articulates the Trump Administration’s strategy on Ukraine and the meeting with President Zelenskyy. pic.twitter.com/clJDdMnNAn

— Rapid Response 47 (@RapidResponse47) March 1, 2025