Zerohedge

Authored by Andrew Korybko via Substack,

Reuters cited unnamed sources to report that Israel is lobbying the US to keep Russia’s bases in Syria as part of a plan to counterbalance Turkish influence there. According to them, Israel fears that Hamas might relocate to Syria and then operate from there under Turkish protection, which could drastically worsen Israeli-Turkish tensions. They didn’t explain how Russia’s continued military presence in Syria could avert that scenario, however, nor how the US could convince Syria not to kick them out either.

Nevertheless, the little that was revealed sheds light on what Israel might have in mind, namely an informal trilateral arrangement centered on their shared interests in preventing Turkiye from dominating post-Assad Syria. 

Should they fail, then Russia fears that Turkiye could hold its bases there hostage as part of some geopolitical blackmail scheme; Israel fears Hamas establishing itself there with Turkish protection; and the US fears the preceding scenario leading to a serious crisis within its allied network.

The first step towards protecting their corresponding interests is to ensure that Syria can rely on Russia as an economic and military counterbalance to Turkiye, which necessitates the US agreeing to let Russia maintain its military presence there. The prerequisite is getting the US to understand Russia’s crucial role in this respect, ergo the reported Israeli lobbying, after which the US would then have to convey this to Syria. That could take the form of assuring it that sanctions relief isn’t conditional on kicking Russia out.

An unnamed high-ranking EU official told reporters in late January that “We have already informed the new authorities in Syria that the normalization process hinges on removing all manner of foreign presence, be it military or some other tentacles. Three countries are present there, and Russia is one of them. So yes, we keep pressing them on this matter.” In spite of that, the EU just lifted some sanctions on energy, transport, and banking, thus suggesting that its position has unofficially changed since then.

This volte-face is either due to Israeli lobbying and/or US pressure, the first of which would show that the EU is still doing regional favors for Israel even after harshly criticizing its conduct in Gaza while the second would show that the transatlantic rift over Ukraine isn’t as serious as many thought. After all, it’s a major concession on the EU’s part to lift some sanctions on Syria even though Russia still retains its two bases there that the bloc demanded be removed as a condition for this, hence the aforesaid speculation.

With this precedent in mind, it can be concluded that Israel has already made progress on relieving external pressure upon Syria to kick Russia out, whether by lobbying the EU and/or the US, the latter with regard to having possibly gotten it to convince the Europeans about the importance of this. The next step is to then ensure that the terms that Syria requires from Russia for keeping its bases aren’t so onerous as to (perhaps deliberately at Turkiye’s behest) scuttle their talks on this issue.

It’s here where the spirit of the nascent Russian–US “New Détente” could see the US can explain to Syria that it wouldn’t object to Russia rebuilding some of its armed forces that Israel destroyed late last year within certain limits and conveying that Israel agrees to this as well. At the same time, the US can also convey that Israel might destroy whatever equipment Syria receives from Turkiye and could resume its years-long bombing campaign there against what it considers to be terrorists, in this case Hamas.

This carrot-and-stick approach might be sufficient for Syria to agree to scale back whatever onerous demands it might make of Russia in exchange for preserving its military presence, provided of course that the interim authorities are rational, though that can’t be taken for granted given their sordid pasts. Should this second step succeed, then the final one would be for the US to advise Syria on how to most effectively leverage its renewed strategic partnership with Russia for counterbalancing Turkiye.

Apart from allowing it to rebuild the Syrian Armed Forces within certain agreed-upon limits, this could take the form of offering Russia more energy and reconstruction contracts to expand its existing presence in these spheres, which can be explained to Turkiye on the basis that Russia has more experience. Even if Turkiye interprets this as a snub, its hands would be tied in terms of how to respond since any vindictive pressure upon Syria could counterproductively push Syria further away from it.

Through these means, Russia, Israel, and the US would advance their shared interests in preventing Turkiye from dominating post-Assad Syria, which could then result in more trilateral cooperation on other issues such as convincing Iran to reach a new nuclear deal with the US. There’s even the possibility of expanding their trilateral to include their shared Indian partner so as to form a quadrilateral for managing European, Mideast, and Asia-Pacific affairs if the “New Détente” leads to a new world order.

Israel knows which way the wind is blowing and will therefore do whatever is needed to ensure that its interests are safeguarded by key players in the global systemic transition. Unilaterally advancing these same interests could entail enormous costs and risks such as if it feels compelled to bomb Hamas militants sheltering in Turkiye’s Syrian bases should that worst-case scenario materialize. That’s why Israel prefers to find common ground with Russia and the US in order for them to help it with this.

While the Russian-US interplay in Syria is pivotal for protecting Israel’s regional security interests, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) is pivotal for advancing Israel’s economic interests. That megaproject was frozen after October 7th but Israel hopes to soon revive it. The US also participates in IMEC while Putin declared that “[IMEC] will only benefit us” so this serves as yet another convergence of their interests with Israel’s and could justify expanding their trilateral into a quadrilateral with India.

For there to be any chance of that happening, the Russian-US interplay in Syria must first succeed in convincing that country’s interim authorities to maintain Russia’s military presence there, after which it must effectively counterbalance Turkiye with Israeli-advised US guidance. Only then might their trilateral move towards other issues, dependent in large part on the “New Détente” unfolding in parallel, and consider inviting India to join them in forming a “Big Four” that geopolitically reshapes Eurasia.

Authored by Venus Upadhayaya via The Epoch Times (emphasis ours),

This article is the second in a series titled “India: The Next Five Years.” Conversations with subject experts, thought leaders, innovators, strategists, and diplomats will explore India’s foreign relations and its global outlook from 2024 to 2029.

India, the world’s fastest-growing economy, is also growing in its understanding of itself. As it does so, its “grand strategy”—the way it views its place in the world—is largely defined by China, experts say.

“China looms increasingly large in India’s strategic consciousness,” writes Dhruva Jaishankar in his recently released book, “Vishwa Shastra: India and the World.”

“Indeed, China’s rise is likely the primary factor influencing India’s grand strategy today.”

“Vishwa Shastra,” is a Sanskrit phrase that means “treatise on the world.” The book offers a consolidated, linear analysis of Indian foreign policy from ancient to modern times.

Jaishankar, who serves as executive director of the Washington-based Observer Research Foundation, told The Epoch Times in an exclusive interview that there are broadly five objectives to India’s “grand strategy.”

“Strengthening India at home, militarily and economically, is [the] number one priority. [Second is] ensuring a stable neighborhood, which has been a big challenge, but the neighborhood has always, again, been a first priority internationally,” Jaishankar said.

Maintaining a balance of power is India’s third priority. The fourth is to address legacy issues concerning India’s partition, which led to the formation of Pakistan and created larger regional consequences. The fifth is to advocate for India’s adequate participation in global rule-making institutions, he said.

These five objectives have largely defined India’s grand strategy since its independence in 1947. Today’s India has more opportunities and resources to achieve these objectives than it has ever had before, according to Jaishankar.

“India is less on the defensive than in the past. It has more resources than in the past. So that’s good in many respects. It has an ability to modernize. It has an ability to settle some of the issues in its periphery. It has the ability to bypass and isolate Pakistan and things like that.”

Articulating India’s Grand Strategy

Srikanth Kondapalli, dean of the School of International Studies at New Delhi’s Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), told The Epoch Times that every major power has a grand strategy that defines its trajectory, looking out 20 to 25 years. Along with its planning for economic, technological, and military development, the grand strategy details a country’s national ethos.

An expert on China’s foreign and security policies, Kondapalli said how much of a nation’s grand strategy is disclosed depends upon the purpose ascribed to it by that nation.

“For example, the Americans have the [Quadrennial] Defense Review and national security strategy.  … The Russians have a strategy like this. The UK has one. China also articulated it in terms of national rejuvenation by 2049, and they have several steps—from up to 2021 up to 2035,” said Kondapalli.

India’s grand strategy has rarely been explicitly articulated, and various authors have attempted to express the country’s vision. Jaishankar’s work attempts to define India’s global impact, exactly 25 years away from the mid-century world. The mid-century is also the timeframe of China’s grand strategy of national rejuvenation, sometimes dubbed “Global China 2049” or “China 2049.”

Kondapalli cited “India 2020,” a 1998 work by India’s former president, A.P.J. Abdul Kalam and Y. S. Rajan. The book outlined a strategy for a developed India looking at the first two decades of the new millennium.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has expressed Indian strategy as “Viksit Bharat 2047.” The phrase “Viksit Bharat,” which means “developed India,” conveys the Indian government’s vision to transform the country into a self-reliant and prosperous economy by 2047.

Kondapalli described the areas defined under Viksit Bharat 2027 as “soft areas of the grand strategy.”

Meanwhile, many of India’s security-related issues are kept guarded and undisclosed, he said. A number of the undisclosed areas concern China.

The Biggest Obstacle—China

Despite its possibilities, India faces many challenges to the achievement of its grand strategy. Looming large among them is China, which analysts define as a major challenge to India’s rise on the world stage.

Geography and history provide the context for the challenge from China. That’s according to Monish Tourangbam, director of the India-based Kalinga Institute of Indo-Pacific Studies.

“Since its inception in 1949, the Sino–Indian war of 1962 and its rise as a global power in the 21st century, communist China has influenced the conception and operationalization of India’s grand strategy,” Tourangbam told The Epoch Times.

Jaishankar said China challenges each of India’s grand strategy objectives.

“The biggest obstacle in each of these five objectives today, arguably, is China. So China is the biggest obstacle to India’s defense procurement, its technology policy, its trade policy, its industrial policy,” he said.

Kondapalli said that since 2009, India has viewed China as a “long-term threat” to its strategic plans. He defined a short-term threat as one within a timeline of five years, a medium-term as 15 years, and long term as one with a timeline of about 35 years.

It was in 2009 that the Indian position shifted to fighting a two-front war—meaning against Pakistan and China—“under the nuclear threshold,” he said, “because both are nuclear.”

“But this is the armed forces strategy, rather than national strategy,” he said, adding that India faces tremendous challenges from China from all other fronts.

Kondapalli said that within India’s grand strategy, the China factor is “uncertain or even negative” due to its territorial dispute with India. He said this dispute is long-term.

“This is not going to be resolved [in the short term]. So you have to factor China in the territorial dispute in the grand strategy,” he said.

Jaishankar cited active competition from China in India’s neighborhood—in countries such as Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. Meanwhile, the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific has also been altered by China’s rise. India is working with other countries to counter that, he added.

Even in international institutions, China is trying to block India’s ascent, he noted.

“China is ultimately the main power most responsible for blocking, say, U.N. Security Council reform, India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group on certain trade issues, and things like that. There is a conflict of interest,” he said.

India’s role in global institutions is increasing. Throughout its 2023 presidency of the Group of 20 (G20) international forum, it played a crucial role in an expanded BRICS and in other platforms of global governance, according to Tourangbam.

However, China is using a two-pronged approach to challenge that increasing influence, he said.

“China’s challenge to India’s rise in global institutions is both ideational and material,” Tourangbam said. India’s democracy and its inclusive model of global governance make it appealing, he said. However, China’s sheer economic size and influence are a challenge for New Delhi to navigate in global institutions.

China’s grand strategy is to be number one: to replace the United States, in particular. Beijing also wants to be number one in Asia, Kondapalli said. But there are powers in Asia—India, Japan, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam—that can compete for that influence and do not want China to mitigate their footprint.

“China’s role in South Asia, Southeast Asia, where it wants to marginalize India, is not acceptable to India,” he said. India’s grand strategy will thus include countering the Chinese grand strategy vis-a-vis territorial issues and competition in Asia.

There are many elements of the strategy, he noted. One element is the QUAD alliance between India, the United States, Japan, and Australia in the Indo-Pacific. Another is Exercise Malabar—joint maritime military exercises between the QUAD countries. Another element is the individual Free Trade Agreements between India and various nations.

And yet another is the recent Modi–Trump meeting. Of that, Kondapelli said, “what transpired we don’t know.”

Looking Toward a Multipolar World

With its rapid economic growth, India is forecast to be the world’s third-largest economy by 2030, behind the United States and China.

Jaishankar described three global schools of thought—unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity—viewed from the perspectives of the three likely leading global economies over the next two decades: the United States, China, and India.

The academic terms describe three systems of geopolitical power distribution. A unipolar world is dominated by one power; a bipolar world is dominated by two major powers, and in a multipolar world, power is distributed among several states. 

India’s grand strategy needs to be understood in the context of expectations that it will make the list of top global powers in the near future, he said.

The United States “is number one,” Jaishankar said. “In an ideal world, the U.S. wants a unipolar world. It has a pure competitor in China today.”

Meanwhile, China—despite its long-term ambition for a unipolar world in which it is number one—acknowledges the bipolarity of today’s world. Its ambition to be the leading global power does not contradict that acknowledgment.

“When China says it wants a new type of great power relationship or talks of avoiding the Thucydides Trap, it is actually acknowledging a bipolar world, but asking the U.S. not to contest it,” Jaishankar said. The Thucydides Trap is the theory—popularized by Harvard scholar Graham Allison—that when a rising global power threatens a ruling one, war frequently results.

Further, “India, being number three, wants a multipolar [world],” he said. “So I think part of it just depends on where they sit.” 

While China supports multilateralism on certain issues and forums, Tourangban said, its support is aimed at blunting America’s influence.

India, on the other hand, aims to create a more inclusive global order, he said.

“India wants to create an externally conducive security environment for its economic rise, and its support for a multipolar world order recognizes the interdependence of economies. Expanding its basket of economic partners, without jeopardizing its core security interests, lies at the heart of India’s support for effective multilateralism in a multipolar world,” he said.

With India’s imminent rise as the third largest global economy, a new global economic paradigm will evolve, according to Jaishankar.

The U.S. economy is currently worth over $30 trillion. The Chinese economy is worth over $19 trillion. India is currently the fifth-largest global economy. It is expected to steal Japan’s fourth-place spot in the next year or so. And, according to a report from S&P Global Ratings, by 2030, India is expected to surpass $7 trillion and become the world’s third-largest economy.

Nonetheless, “there [will] be a big gap between the U.S. and China, on the one hand, and between China and India on the other,” Jaishankar said. There will also emerge a big gap between India and everyone else on that list, he said. But precisely by virtue of that gap, India will play a leading role in a multipolar world, he said.

The situation will secure a unique place for India, Jaishankar said. India will guard that place to prevent its interests from being marginalized in decision-making by the United States and China. 

“India will strive for a more multipolar world, which means a world where everything is not simply decided by the U.S. and China. I think that’s a great, good concern for India,” he said.

How India will secure and advance its interests in a multipolar world order will be a “test of fire” for India’s grand strategy, said Tourangbam.

India’s Role in World Order

When asked what role India would play in facilitating a multipolar world, Jaishankar listed a number of objectives.

Those include taking a leadership role in Southeast Asia, securing the Indian Ocean, connecting with its neighbors and with the Middle East, and using “carrots and sticks” to coax Pakistan away from supporting terror groups.

They also include managing India’s relationship with China in a way that promotes competition but doesn’t lead to conflict, according to Jaishankar.

Delving into this further, Kondapalli explained that India’s approach to multilateral forums is led by its interests.

Both India and China are a part of various common multilateral forums. It’s assumed that they are not there to discuss bilateral issues or sovereignty issues, he said. Instead, their involvement implies that problems can be resolved through confidence-building measures and peaceful strategies.

Multilateral forums can be useful for advancing bilateral issues. Kondapalli cited a subtle approach by India on multilateral platforms—one example being the meeting between Modi and China’s Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Kazan last year.  The two leaders decided to let their national security advisers discuss their territorial dispute.

“And then we saw some forward momentum in this regard,” he said.

Jaishankar emphasized that India’s thought leadership in a multipolar world would involve working with balancing powers, like the United States, Japan, Australia, and others, to “diversify and strengthen” supply chains.

It would also mean countering China by diversifying Indian strategic interests. Having many strategic or economic partners would ensure that if China threatened to cut off supply chains or investment, it would not unduly affect India, he said.

A close friend of Vladimir Putin – and like the Russian president, also a spy – has been engineering a restart of Russia’s Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline to Europe with the backing of US investors, a once unthinkable move which according to the FT, shows the breadth of Donald Trump’s rapprochement with Moscow. According to the Nikkei-owned publication, the efforts on a deal were the brainchild of Matthias Warnig, an ex-Stasi officer in East Germany who until 2023 ran Nord Stream 2’s parent company for the Kremlin-controlled gas giant Gazprom.

Warnig’s plan involved outreach to the Trump team through US businessmenas part of back-channel efforts to broker an end to the war in Ukraine while deepening economic ties between the US and Russia.

If this was just some unilateral attempt to get the pipeline that was bombed by Western intelligence agents and assorited Ukrainian hangers-on back online, it would hardly be a surprise. However, according to the report it appears that at least several “prominent” Trump administration figures are aware of the initiative to bring in US investors, and they see it as part of the push to rebuild relations with Moscow.

While there have been several expressions of interest, one US-led consortium of investors has drawn up the outlines of a post-sanctions deal with Gazprom. 

Meanwhile, senior EU officials have become aware of the Nord Stream 2 discussion only in recent weeks, and leaders of several European countries are concerned and have discussed the matter, although it is unclear what the prevailing sense on the ground within the corridors of Brussels. It is far easier, for example, to guess what Germany thinks about a return of much cheaper and far more abundant Russian energy if virtue signaling and politics were not an issue.

One of Nord Stream 2’s two pipelines was blown up in what now appears to have been a US attack in September 2022 that destroyed both pipelines of its older sister project Nord Stream 1. The other Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which has an annual capacity of 27.5bn cubic metres of natural gas, is undamaged but has never been used.

The latest plan would in theory give the US unparalleled sway over energy supplies to Europe, after EU countries moved to end their dependence on Russian gas in the aftermath of the invasion.

That said, the obstacles are considerable: a deal would require the US to lift sanctions against Russia, Russia to agree to resume sales it cut off during the war, and Germany to allow the gas to flow to any potential buyers in Europe.

“The US would say, ‘Well, now Russia will be dependable because trustworthy Americans are in the middle of it’,’” said a former senior US official, who was aware of some of the dealmaking efforts. The US investors would collect “money for nothing”, he added.

The talks come as the Trump administration races to seal a peace deal through bilateral discussions with Russia that have excluded Europe and Ukraine, spooking deep-state apparatchiks in European capitals who fear a US détente with Moscow could threaten the continent. Trump has promised deeper economic co-operation with Russia if a peace agreement can be reached.

Putin has talked up the economic benefits he says the US could reap with the Kremlin in the event of a settlement in Ukraine, claiming that “several companies” were already in touch over potential deals.

Nord Stream 2 AG, the pipeline’s Swiss-based parent company, received an exceptional stay on bankruptcy proceedings in January by at least four months.

According to a redacted court document, Nord Stream 2’s shareholder — Gazprom — argued that the new Trump administration, as well as the German election in February 2025, “presumably can have significant consequences on the circumstances of Nord Stream 2” to warrant a delay. The submission pointed to “complex geopolitical affairs” and the sanctions regime.

Warnig told the Financial Times he was “not involved in any discussions with any American politicians or business representatives”, adding that he was “following in this respect the rules [as a] US-sanctioned person”. Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s spokesman, said he had no information on any talks regarding the pipeline.

Warnig, 69, has said he became a close friend of Putin’s in the 1990s after setting up an office for lender Dresdner Bank in St Petersburg, where the then-unknown Putin headed the city’s foreign relations committee. The two became so close that Putin asked Warnig to put up his daughters at the banker’s house in Rödermark when their mother was seriously injured in a car accident.

Putin, who speaks fluent German, taught Warnig’s children to ski in Davos and invited him to his father’s funeral, according to a 2023 interview with the former Stasi officer in Die Zeit.

But Warnig called Putin’s invasion an “indescribable mistake” and resigned from the boards of two Kremlin-run energy companies after the war in Ukraine broke out in 2022. He told Die Zeit that he made a personal appeal to Putin to end the invasion a few months in and said the Russian president was so isolated that “the only person who can still say something to him is me”.

Warnig left Nord Stream 2 AG, the Russian-owned company that manages the pipeline, in 2023, but told Die Zeit that Gazprom’s chief executive, Alexei Miller, had guaranteed to cover its costs in the hope of saving what remained.

Joe Biden’s US administration sanctioned Warnig and Nord Stream 2 AG in 2022. Biden officials showed little interest in a proposal to buy Nord Stream 2 last year from Stephen Lynch, an American businessman with a record of working in Russia. Other potential investors have come forward since Lynch first expressed interest. The person with direct knowledge of Gazprom’s discussions told the FT that its advanced talks were with a different US-led consortium from Lynch.

Trump was outspoken in his criticism of the pipeline during his first term as president. It has become a symbol for those who blamed Germany and Europe, by extension, for relying too much on Russian gas and helping to finance Moscow’s military machine. But some of Trump’s team now see the pipeline, which runs from Russia’s Vyborg in the Gulf of Finland to Greifswald on Germany’s Baltic coast, as a strategic asset that can be leveraged in the Ukraine peace talks, according to administration officials.

That said, the complex ownership structure of Nord Stream 2 presents serious potential obstacles for any investment. Nord Stream 2 is 100% owned by Gazprom. But five European energy companies — Shell, Uniper, OMV, Engie and Wintershall — collectively provided around half of its $11bn construction costs through loans. All five European companies have written off those debts.

The German government in 2022 pulled the plug on the licensing procedure of Nord Stream 2 and never issued the paperwork required to operate it.

Ownership of the pipeline could in theory give US investors a leve r to control Russian gas flows to Europe, which is a key market for US liquefied natural gas exports shipped across the Atlantic in tankers.

But former senior US officials and western businessmen with experience investing in Russia said Trump and Putin’s sign-off alone would not be enough to get Nord Stream 2 up and running.

“I can’t imagine the board of any major US corporations saying, ‘Hey, let’s jump back into the Russian market’ right now, and the Russians know this too — they’ve seen these oscillations in American policy,” a former senior US official said.

“Europe still has sanctions in place, and Germany signing up for the rehabilitation of Nord Stream would cause huge rifts. Anything like that is a ways off.”

One can only wonder which three-letter agency said former senior US official worked for. Meanwhile, news of the report is – according to one of Goldman’s top traders – one of the reasons why the bank expects a brutal short squeeze tomorrow, to wit:

Tomorrow will be a painful short squeeze day, as risk assets are likely to rally aggressively not only on the crypto news flow over the weekend: I see 4 positive weekend news.

• Putin ally pushes deal to restart Nord Stream 2 with US backing. Short EU natural Gas still in place.
• US hints that tariffs on Mexico and Canada could be lower than 25%. Probably an EM risk rally.
• Germany’s new gov are quickly setting up two 400bn special funds, one for defence one for infrastructure.
• Bessent weekend interview focused on 1) lowering inflation via controlling 10y yields 2) Tariffs as a path dependent toll 3) Constructive on the relationship with China.

More in the following article.

Five years after Citi triggered the biggest fat finger of all time when it mistakenly sent $900 million to creditors engaged in a contentious battle over the debt of cosmetics group Revlon, a transaction which resulted in a brutal legal fight and a crushing plunge in its reputation, the bank has done it again.

According to the FT, Citigroup credited a client’s account with $81tn when it meant to send only $280, an error that surely hinder the bank’s attempt to persuade regulators that it has fixed long-standing operational issues.

Citi’s $81tn near miss in April was due to an input error and a back-up system with a cumbersome user interface, according to FT sources. In mid-March, four transactions totaling $280 destined for a customer’s escrow account in Brazil had been blocked by a screen that catches payments that are potential sanction violations. The payment was quickly cleared, but nonetheless remained stuck in the bank’s system and unable to be completed normally.

Citi’s technology team instructed the payments processing employee to manually input the transactions into a rarely used back-up screen. One quirk of the program was that the amount field came pre-populated with 15 zeros, which the person inputting a transaction needed to delete. Needless to say, that did not happen.

The erroneous internal transfer, which occurred last April and was first reported by the FT, was missed by both a payments employee and a second official assigned to check the transaction before it was approved to be processed at the start of business the following day.

A third employee detected a problem with the bank’s account balances, catching the payment 90 minutes after it was posted. The payment was reversed several hours later, according to an internal account of the event seen by the Financial Times and two people familiar with the event.

No funds left Citi, which only disclosed the “near miss” to the Federal Reserve and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. The bank said its “detective controls promptly identified the inputting error between two Citi ledger accounts and we reversed the entry” and that these mechanisms “would have also stopped any funds leaving the bank”.

It added: “While there was no impact to the bank or our client, the episode underscores our continued efforts to continue eliminating manual processes and automating controls.” Considering the bank’s “manual processes” just transferred 3 times the GDP of the US to some unknown account, it is safe to say that there are absolutely no controls whatsoever.

According to the FT, a total of 10 near misses – incidents when a bank processes the wrong amount but is ultimately able to recover the funds – of $1bn or greater occurred at Citi last year. The figure was down slightly from 13 the previous year. Citi declined to comment on this broader set of events.

Near misses do not need to be reported to regulators, meaning there is no comprehensive public data on how often these incidents occur across the sector. Still, former regulators and bank risk managers said near misses of greater than $1bn were unusual across the US bank industry.

The series of near misses at Citi highlights how the Wall Street bank is struggling to repair its operational troubles nearly five years after it mistakenly sent $900mn to creditors engaged in a contentious battle over the debt of cosmetics group Revlon, and who then refused to return the bulk of the transfer. Readers may recall that it was Citi’s mistaken Revlon payout led to the ousting of then-CEO Michael Corbat, big fines and the imposition of regulatory consent orders requiring it to fix the issues. Clearly the “issues” have not been fixed.

Jane Fraser, who took over as Citi’s top executive from Corbat in 2021, has described fixing Citi’s regulatory issues as her “top priority”. Still, the group was fined $136mn last year by the OCC and Federal Reserve for failing to correct problems in risk control and data management.

Which brings up an interesting question: what would you do if you woke up on morning and found a dollar number with 15 zeros behind it? Here is one money laundering proposal from Tanning Salon Don.

Wake up, see $81t in my account. Start moving fast

Load up 10 flash drives with $1b in every kind of Crypto and head straight to the airport

Give my fiancé 10 minutes to decide if she’s coming with me

We will probably see our friends and family again but I don’t know

Once in Columbia lay low a few days. Distribute flash drives in random hotel rooms. Send one back to my family with the note “I’m alive. Put this flash drive somewhere safe, don’t tell anyone about this”

Then find a coke dealer. “Let me talk to your boss for $10k. Let me talk to his boss for $20k”

“I need a new identity and European passport. Can pay any amount”

Then I fly somewhere in Europe and open a tanning salon / med spa to start laundering money. Within a year start claiming $10m of EBITDA and paying taxes.

Then start an AI company burning a ton of money

Fly to Saudi Arabia for VC funding but in the meetings I put my cards on the table

“Listen. I’ll give you $5b of crypto if you legitimately buy my AI business for $700m”

Just need one taker

Buy a gold immigration card

Move back to the states

You now have a legitimate $700m in the system and a few flash drives you can use if ever needed

Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced on Sunday that all civilian DoD employees need to respond to an email from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) asking them what they did last week – which Elon Musk and DOGE are now making a weekly task.

“I am now directing each member of the department’s civilian workforce — just civilian — to provide those five bullets on what they accomplished in their specific jobs last week,” Hegseth posted on X. “To reply to that email and CC their immediate supervisor.”

“It’s a simple task, really, as Elon [Musk] said, as the President recognized in our first Cabinet meeting, just a pulse check — ‘Are you there out?’ — to DOD civilians,” Hegseth added – noting that DoD civilian employees will soon get a second email outlining next steps “that they need to take in order to comply with this initiative.”

🇺🇸🇺🇸

— Elon Musk (@elonmusk) March 2, 2025

The move comes after Pentagon officials initially instructed employees to ignore the first OPM email from Feb. 22. Hegseth said the ‘hold off’ notice was only temporary so that the DoD could conduct “a review of Pentagon procedures and consultation with the Office of Personal Management.”

According to Hegseth, the Dod “needed to be careful” due to the sensitive nature of Pentagon work.

Meanwhile, Hegseth took time out of his day to torch former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on X, after Clinton suggested he was kowtowing to Russia based on an anonymous report amplified by Gizmodo.

pic.twitter.com/2W9Wp3LwR1

— Pete Hegseth (@PeteHegseth) March 2, 2025

Are you not entertained?

Authored by Jason Ditz via AntiWar.com,

Israel’s decision to continue to occupy territory in southern Lebanon beyond the prior February 18 deadline came without a lot of official comment from the US. According to recent comments of Israeli DM Israel Katz, however, the US gave them a “green light” to remain militarily in Lebanon indefinitely.

Israeli media was reporting around the deadline that the US was backing the continued occupation of five surveillance posts inside southern Lebanon. The US never directly confirmed that, however, and that Israel remains in Lebanon just came and went without official US comment.

The ceasefire ending the Israeli invasion of Lebanon was meant to provide a 60-day window for Israeli withdrawal, which would’ve ended January 26. The US guaranteed that Israel would be out by then, but then later endorsed extending the deadline to February 18. They similarly talked about February 18 being a firm deadline that would not be extended, but then stopped talking about it at all beyond that.

Israel started building the hilltop surveillance posts before the February 18 deadline, and Israeli FM Gideon Sa’ar said that the “strategic high points” would be necessary to retain temporarily, until the Lebanese Army has sufficient control of the south.

The temporary nature of those posts seems to be at considerable doubt from Katz’s comments. He no longer presented this as anything to do with Lebanese Army control of the area, and just maintains that it is “not time-dependent.” It appears Israel will be staying as long as it wants, and the US is comfortable with that idea.

Lebanon is not so keen on the continued occupation, as it’s condemned Israel staying in the area and urged the US and France, the initial guarantors of the ceasefire, to do something about it. France proposed sending its own troops to replace the Israelis, but Israel rejected that.

Adding to the Lebanese disquiet about Israel’s surveillance-focused occupation, the Lebanese Army announced that it had found a number of hidden surveillance devices in southern Lebanon since Israeli troops left the populated areas. Sensors and cameras were reportedly found hidden in trees and among rocks around the area.

In practice, the tree-cameras are probably less of a problem than the actual Israeli ground troops still in Lebanese territory for surveillance purposes. Yet even those cameras reflect a reality where getting Israel militarily out of Lebanon is only the first step toward ending the surveillance operation.

Via The Cradle

Iran’s Minister of Economy Abdolnaser Hemmati was impeached on Sunday after the Iranian parliament gave a vote of no confidence, coming as Tehran faces an economic crisis and continued sanctions from the west. 

Hemmati appeared before parliament on Sunday to address mounting complaints from lawmakers over his ministry’s performance amid the Islamic Republic’s worsening economic crisis. 

The motion to dismiss the minister received 182 votes in favor. Eighty-nine voted against the motion, and one abstained. 

Hemmati gave a speech during the open session, defending his ministry’s policies but welcoming the call for his impeachment as part of the democratic process. 

“In 2018, the country’s economic conditions were much more problematic than they are now, but we stood firm and withstood the maximum pressure,” he said, adding that it is “the right of the people’s representatives” and that “Impeachment is a manifestation of political progress and will lead to greater empathy, but they are wrong about my lack of responsiveness to problems.”

“The claim that the government has increased the exchange rate is not true,” he asserted, adding that US President Donald Trump has “declared economic war on us.”

President Masoud Pezeshkian attended the session in defense of his minister, stressing that Iran’s economic issues date back years and replacing a single official will not remedy the crisis. 

“Can one person alone decide and implement economic measures, and then we blame him for all the errors and say that if he leaves, the problems will be solved? The only way to overcome problems is through unity and empathy,” the president said. 

Iran’s currency has fallen to a record low against the US dollar recently, resulting in a surge in prices for local products and an increased demand for gold. 

Since entering office in January, Trump has renewed his “maximum pressure” policy of sanctions against Iran, which began during his first term. Trump has particularly cracked down hard on Iranian oil shipments. Tehran has blasted Washington for expressing a willingness to hold nuclear negotiations and, at the same time, resuming a full-fledged economic war against the country. 

Pezeshkian and other Iranian officials say they will not negotiate under pressure. On Saturday, Pezeshkian said that “engagement, trade, and cooperation with regional nations, when executed effectively and in conjunction with regional organizations such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the BRICS group, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), will render US sanctions ineffective, and we will confront these challenges with strength, dignity, and honor.”

Iran’s Parliament IMPEACHES economy minister

Hemmati blamed for mismanaging economy and skyrocketing inflation

Also accused of sabotaging electricity situation to PRESSURE Iran into pro-US negotiations https://t.co/YuNPGZWeEz pic.twitter.com/QYD1FCnvM1

— RT (@RT_com) March 2, 2025

“If we come together, we can create the necessary conditions to solve problems alongside producers, industrialists, managers, and the talented individuals in our country,” he added. 

Authored by Savannah Hulsey Pointer  via The Epoch Times (emphasis ours),

Some noteworthy figures in the Trump administration fall under the category of special government employees. The most high-profile one is Elon Musk.

The status of special government employee allows individuals to work for both the federal government and the private sector simultaneously. Those working as special government employees are limited to working up to 130 days per year unless the administration expressly extends that limit.

Congress first passed legislation in the early 1960s to allow the executive branch to bring in outside experts without forcing them out of their private sector or academic positions. This has allowed experts in various sectors to serve on advisory boards or in specialized roles at the president’s request without giving up their careers, like regular government employees.

This allowance, signed into law by President John F. Kennedy in 1962, gives permission for the government to temporarily employ experts without aggressive conflict of interest restrictions.

Because of special government employee allowances, specialized experts such as doctors, scientists, and business leaders have contributed to national policy. These temporary roles are subject to most of the rules and regulations that apply to regular full-time employees.

Special government employees are prohibited from dealing with subjects that would create a financial conflict of interest for themselves and they aren’t allowed to use their role to influence an election or engage in political activity while they’re on duty.

Some examples of frequently held special government employee positions are members of federal advisory committees, consultants at the Department of Justice, and scientific and medical experts for federal health agencies.

While the government doesn’t offer exact figures for special government employees, in 2016, the Government Accountability Office released findings that indicated that from 2005 to 2014, an average of about 2,000 special government employees worked for the government each year, excluding those serving on federal boards.

High Profile Special Government Employees 

The designation of Musk as a special government employee has raised questions about his actual position and authority.

Officially, Musk serves as a senior adviser to the president, a position similar to that of former President Joe Biden’s special government employee adviser, Anita Dunn.

President Donald Trump has said that Musk oversees the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), a the new advisory panel designed to root out waste, fraud, and abuse in the federal government.

Trump told investors at an event in Miami on Feb. 19 that when he signed the order to create DOGE, he put Musk in charge.

The day to day operations of DOGE are undertaken by Amy Gleason, as acting administrator of DOGE, a White House official confirmed on Feb. 25.

Another high-profile special government employee is Steve Witkoff, who is the administration’s Middle East special envoy and is working to handle peace talks between Ukraine and Russia, as well as in the Middle East. Like Musk, Witkoff is a billionaire, and like Trump, his career has been spent in real estate investing and development.

Special government employee David Sacks serves as the White House’s artificial intelligence and cryptocurrency czar, advising the president on issues related to artificial intelligence and cryptocurrency. He is the former PayPal chief operating officer and currently a partner and co-founder at Craft Ventures, a venture capital firm.

Trump’s faith adviser, Paula White, is another special government employee with a presence at the White House as head of the White House Faith Office. She has also maintained her position in the ministry outside of government.

Controversial Special Government Employees

Not all special government employees have had a quiet tenure working in Washington. Some of the more contentious figures include Huma Abedin, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s deputy chief of staff. Abedin was a special government employee who also worked for Teneo, a consulting firm.

The State Department’s employment of Abedin caused concern for some, including Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), who said the designation of special government employee was created for “technical outside expertise rather than for a current government employee’s convenience or desire for outside employment.”

“The executive branch should not do an end run around Congress and ignore the time restriction or use the designation merely to allow current federal employees to enhance their income with outside employment that might present conflicts of interest.”

President Joe Biden’s top aide Anita Dunn also held an special government employee designation. She worked for the White House while keeping her Democratic consulting and lobbying firm position at SKDK.

Special government employees have had a role in response to major national events, including serving on the 9/11 Commission and as advisers on COVID-19 policy.

When asked about Musk’s status, White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt echoed previous comments, saying he is an special government employee who is overseeing DOGE and is working under Trump’s direction.

By Chris Marsh of Money: Inside and Out

Europe has to urgently find a solution to a depleted defence capability.

But how much should Europe be looking to spend on the military? It’s useful to begin by considering how much neglect there has been in recent years.

A decade of underspend

Consider NATO official figures on defense spending.

Since 2014, in the aggregate NATO countries have spent around 2.5% of GDP on defense. But this is largely because the US spends closer to 3.5% of GDP (and is the largest country in economic terms.) Europe and Canada combined spent only 1.5% of GDP for most of the past decade—only increasing to 2% of GDP in 2024.

Looking at the large European countries, the UK has spent more than 2% of GDP throughout whereas, until recently, Germany consistently spent below 1.5% of GDP and France just below 2% of GDP. Italy and Spain (not shown) typically spend less than Germany.

Stock versus flows

Much of the discussion about increasing defense spending in light of recent geopolitical developments fails to acknowledge that this protracted under-spend has left a stock problem — a depleted stock of weapons, other hardware, and technology; but also gaps in operational capacity, full spectrum battlefield capability, and personnel.

As such, while increasing defense spending today is welcome, it will only fill the “stock” gap slowly.

Consider the cumulative underspend by NATO countries over the past decade relative to the 2% target and relative to US spending in % of GDP. Data provided by NATO only begins in 2014. This is shown in the chart below.

• Germany’s shortfall to 2% is largest in absolute terms and adds up to above EUR200bn, Italy about EUR150bn, etc. The aggregate shortfall for Europe is EUR850bn.

• To reach further and “catch-up” with the US spending closer to 3.5% of GDP Germany would need to spend an additional EUR550bn (or EUR800bn in total), Italy and France would need to spend above EUR400bn in total, and so on. The aggregate shortfall for Europe since 2014 exceeds EUR2,650bn.

This same shortfall can be measured relative to the latest GDP as in the next chart.

With the exceptions of Poland, Greece and Estonia, European countries are typically at least 10% of GDP behind compared to if their spending had matched the US—and this is closer to 20% in many cases.

Time to act

Of course, it doesn’t quite work like this.

Perhaps it could be argued the US is preparing for possible military action on two fronts at the same time—Europe and the Pacific. As such, US spending has to go further.

In addition, a cumulative past spending shortfall might be made up without a one-for-one spending today—alternatively the hurdle to technological catch-up is so great that more may be needed. A military expert would need to break this down.

The point is, the discussion about increased defense spending appears to be focused on correcting the existing flow shortfall—rather than addressing the stock, or capability challenges due to past neglect.

Still, over the past decade the US has spent USD8.4 trillion on defense. The rest of NATO? USD3.8 trillion.

So the United States has spent more that double the rest of NATO since 2014. If the US has stepped out of the alliance, de facto or de jure, what spending need to fill the capability gap?

LAFD fire stations are in disrepair, with firefighters often funding and handling repairs themselves, according to The Free Press.  

At a Pico-Robertson station, two firefighters were seen filling a three-foot pothole with sand. At another, a sewage leak had persisted for six months—“now the ceiling is falling in.”

A source reported that at least 12 of the city’s 106 stations were infested with mold. At Fire Station 112, an April 2022 report found 2.3 million spores in the dining hall, where a safe level is under 700. A firefighter who paid for the test claimed his chief became so ill he was hospitalized, resulting in a thumb amputation. Another firefighter refused to enter the kitchen because his “face would break into hives.”

At a station east of downtown, a broken window had been boarded up, and roof tiles showed water damage. Another firefighter stated that the LAFD ignored a broken garage door for a year—only repairing it after the community raised funds.

A firefighter, speaking anonymously for fear of retaliation, said “anyone legitimate would say the station needs to be torn down.”

The Free Press article notes that the LAFD’s budget was cut by $17.6 million last year, a reduction Fire Chief Kristin Crowley said had “adversely affected” the department’s “ability to maintain core operations,” including fire prevention. Mayor Karen Bass has denied that the cuts have impacted firefighting efforts, despite blazes that have killed 27 people and destroyed 12,000 buildings.

Firefighters working 24-hour shifts have been struggling in deteriorating conditions, affecting both morale and well-being.

At a Cahuenga Pass station on Wednesday night, a firefighter grew emotional when discussing the state of his workplace. “I’ve complained and no one will listen. I’ve begged and pleaded,” he said, looking down. “I used to be bitter, upset, and angry. But I just gave up.”

“We can’t extend ourselves if we don’t have anything. We’re not looking for money, we’re just looking to do our job.”

You can watch the Free Press’ full video here.